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I. INTRODUCTION
Advancements in technology, coupled with society’s ever-increasing
reliance on and acceptance of computer-based and online social media
networking websites, have created a number of new legal quandaries.
For instance, the 2007 tragedy surrounding the suicide death of Mis-
souri teen Megan Meier1 renewed debate as to whether there should
be an expansion of the boundaries of tort law to make liable people’s
actions on social media websites.2  Meier’s case also revived debate
regarding the propriety of traditional civil procedure notions of venue
and personal jurisdiction concerning where to litigate matters involv-
ing alleged wrongdoing in cyberspace.3
Other areas of the law have created similar sui generis legal con-
cerns in response to the increased popularity and infiltration of social
media into modern life.  Employers have actively begun investigating
prospective employees’ Facebook and other social media profiles and
pages in search of any objectionable material that would raise any
1. See, e.g., Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No
Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, at A23; Tamara Jones, A Deadly Web of Deceit;
A Teen’s Online ‘Friend’ Proved False, and Cyber-Vigilantes Are Avenging Her,
WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2008, at C1.  Federal prosecutors alleged that Lori Drew, the
mother of another student at Megan Meier’s school, was behind the “flirtatious In-
ternet chats” between Meier, and who Meier thought was a sixteen year old boy
named Josh Evans. See William M. Welch, Woman Indicted In ‘Cyberbullying’ Case;
Federal Prosecutors Say MySpace Hoax Led to Death of Teenage Girl, USA TODAY,
May 16, 2008, at 3A.  Drew created the account and communicated with Meier, ulti-
mately sending hurtful messages to the young woman that were alleged to have
pushed Meier to suicide. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Verdict in MySpace Suicide Case,
NY TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/us/27mys-
pace.html.
2. See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERK.
TECH. L.J. 1103, 1129–37 (2011); Megan Rowan, When Words Hurt More than “Sticks
and Stones”:  Why New York State Needs Cyberbullying Legislation, 22 ALB. L.J. SCI.
& TECH. 645, 648–49 (2012); Matthew C. Ruedy, Repercussions of a MySpace Teen
Suicide:  Should Anti-Cyberbullying Laws be Created?, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH 323 (2007);
Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom, State Legislation Mandating School Cyberbullying Poli-
cies and the Potential Threat to Students’ Free Speech Rights, 33 VT. L. REV. 283,
285–86 (2008–2009); Andrew M. Henderson, High-Tech Words Do Hurt:  A Modern
Makeover Expands Missouri’s Harassment Law to Include Electronic Communica-
tions, 74 MO. L. REV. 379, 380 (2009); Kevin Turbert, Faceless Bullies:  Legislative and
Judicial Responses to Cyberbullying, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 651 (2008–2009);
Nicholas R. Johnson, Recent Development:  “I Agree” to Criminal Liability:  Lori
Drew’s Prosecution Under §1030(A)(2)(C) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and
Why Every Internet User Should Care, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 561 (2009).
3. Federal prosecutors indicted Lori Drew with violating the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, with the case heard in the Central District of California, even though
Drew and Meier both lived in Missouri. See Indictment at 9, United States v. Drew,
No. CR-08-582-GW (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2008), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news
.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/cyberlaw/usdrew51508ind.pdf).  The prosecution believed
that such venue was appropriate, because MySpace’s servers which hosted the com-
munications were located in Los Angeles, CA. See Steinhauer, supra note 1. R
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concerns about the employees’ suitability.4  That employees have
been fired as a result of their social media postings, regardless
of whether such postings were written about their employer, has
led to debates concerning the legality of such employment actions.5
In the intellectual property field, imposters have created pages
purporting to be the “official” profile of unwitting companies or pub-
lic figures, even though the companies or public figures often have
no affiliation whatsoever with the pages.6  Such actions may trigger
4. See e.g., Rachel Ryan, Yes, Employers Will Check Your Facebook Before Of-
fering You a Job, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
rachel-ryan/hiring-facebook_b_2795047.html.  Many employees have been fired after
their employers discovered social media content and postings that were controversial
or objectionable. See e.g. Ismat Sarah Mangla, Fired for Facebook:  Don’t Let it Hap-
pen to you, TIME (Apr. 21, 2009), http://time.com/money/2792542/fired-for-facebook-
dont-let-it-happen-to-you/fired-for-facebook-dont-let-it-happen-to-you/; Mike Simp-
son, Social Networking Nightmares; Cyberspeak no Evil, NATIONAL EDUCATION AS-
SOCIATION, http://www.nea.org/home/38324.htm (last visited May 1, 2015);  Victor
Luckerson, Nordstrom Employee Fired Over Racially Charged Facebook Post, TIME
(Dec. 16, 2014), http://time.com/3636220/nordstrom-aaron-hodges/.  The advice pro-
vided by many Career Offices at universities in recent years have warned students and
graduates to avoid posting anything that may be construed as controversial or objec-
tionable on their respective Facebook pages for fear that they may be viewed by po-
tential employers. See e.g., Kristen Uhl Hulse, A Guide to e-Professionalism for
Attorneys:  Five Steps to Create and Maintain a Professional Online Persona, GE-
ORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/
academic-programs/graduate-programs/careers/multimedia-library/career-toolbox/
upload/eProfessionalism.pdf (last visited May 1, 2015).  Anecdotal evidence has been
reported that students have lost employment opportunities as a result of photographs
and postings that portrayed the candidate in a negative light. See, e.g., Joseph P.
Kahn, E-trails of trouble, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.boston.com/
jobs/2013/02/14/college-seniors-list-this-spring-complete-degree-credits-clean-online-
profile/Nb0WYOg4ZpzlC00KclKitO/story.html (relating the story of a Boston law
firm that rescinded an offer to a prospective employee after discovering a Facebook
picture of the candidate at a party with illegal drugs visible).
5. See  Melanie Trottman, For Angry Employees, Legal Cover for Rants, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020371070457704
9822809710332 (reporting how the National Labor Relations Board has often re-
ceived and acted on complaints by employees fired as a result of social media activity,
and whether such firings have merit); Martha Neil, When can workers be fired for
Facebook posts and tweets, ABA J. (Jan. 29, 2013, 5:09 PM), http://www.abajournal
.com/news/article/worker_says_on_facebook_she_wants_to_be_fired_and_is_nlrb_
rulings_offer_gui; Josh Eidelson, Can You Be Fired for What You Post on Facebook?,
SLATE (July 3, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/
2012/07/getting_fired_for_what_you_post_on_facebook.html; Jennifer Preston, Social
media History Becomes a New Job Hurdle, NY TIMES (July 20, 2011), http://www
.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/technology/social-media-history-becomes-a-new-job-hurdle
.html.
6. See e.g. Sarah E. Needleman, Companies Cope with Twitter Imposters, WALL
ST. J. (June 29, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124623159206366203; Aislinn
Laing, Twitter Cracks Down on Fake Accounts Amid Legal Threats, TELEGRAPH
(Sept. 20, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/6211014/Twitter-
cracks-down-on-fake-accounts-amid-legal-threats.html; Alexander Tsoutsanis, Tack-
ling Twitter and Facebook Fakes:  Identity Theft in Social Media, 12 WORLD DATA
PROTECTION REP. (BNA) No. 4 (Apr. 2012), available at https://files.dlapiper.com/
files/Uploads/Documents/.
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violations of the profiled entities’ rights of publicity or trademark
rights.7
The role of social media has triggered debate in criminal law and
national security law as well.8  As this Article discusses, the use of
social media as a meaningful tool for law enforcement has increased in
recent years.9  The law is still evolving as to whether and when the
exploitation of information gleaned from those sources triggers a vio-
lation of the traditional constitutional protections against government
intrusion.  Given the vast resources the government has reportedly
dedicated to national security, intelligence, and defense agencies to
support data mining and analysis in recent years,10 the boundaries be-
tween citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights and government’s role in
providing for national security have become blurred to a point where
citizens are growing concerned over whether such activities have led
to an intrusion into civil liberties.11
7. The right of publicity prevents a party from using another person’s notoriety
to profit commercially at the expense of the targeted entity. See, e.g., Zacchini v.
Scripps Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569–78 (1977) (recognizing the right of
publicity as a protectable interest granting individuals exclusive control over the pub-
licity given to their name or performance so they may “reap the rewards of [their]
endeavors” in commercializing their talents and energy).
8. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2010); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a
Networked World:  First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L.
REV. 741 (2008); Paul Ham, Warrantless Search and Seizure of E-mail and Methods of
Panoptical Prophylaxis, 2008 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1 (2008), http://bciptf
.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/16-warrantless-search-and-seizure-of-e-mail-and-
methods-of-panoptical-prophylaxis.pdf; Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth Amendment
Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1381 (2008); William Federspiel, 1984 Arrives:
Thought (Crime), Technology and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 865
(2008); Rachel S. Martin, Note, Watch What You Type:  As the FBI Records Your
Keystrokes, the Fourth Amendment Develops Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, 40 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1271 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Joel Mathis, Report:  Suspects in Gay Bashing Will Meet Police To-
day, PHILADELPHIA MAGAZINE (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.phillymag.com/news/
2014/09/17/report-suspects-gay-bashing-will-meet-police-today (noting use of Twitter/
Facebook by social media to provide police with clues and evidence to track down
suspects).
10. See, e.g., James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy
Center (Watch What You Say), WIRED (Mar. 2012), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/1 (reporting that the National Security Agency has begun
construction on a $2 billion dollar data center in Utah designed to “intercept, deci-
pher, analyze, and store vast swaths of the world’s communications as they zap down
from satellites and zip through the underground and undersea cables of international,
foreign, and domestic networks”).  This facility was made possible in part by the
NSA’s near limitless budget, estimated to be “overflowing with tens of billions of
dollars in post-9/11 budget awards.” Id.
11. For instance, news that major technology companies including Google, Ver-
izon, Facebook and Microsoft, had routinely provided the National Security Agency
with records and information about its users spurred debate and criticism about
whether such practices infringed the civil liberties of the nation’s citizenry. See, e.g.,
Charlie Savage, Edward Wyatt & Peter Baker, U.S. Confirms That It Gathers Online
Data Overseas, NY TIMES (June 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/nsa-
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This Article seeks to qualify somewhat the growing consensus that,
at least as it was known in the twentieth century, “privacy is dead.”
Although this sentiment seems empirically correct, this Article argues
it is an oversimplification that fails to account for American values
and legal policy.  Rather, the Authors recognize as a morally neutral
proposition that privacy is a legal fiction.  At the same time, this Arti-
cle advocates that it is a fiction best maintained and protected to the
extent possible and reasonable given the unambiguous willingness of
people en masse to sacrifice their privacy for mere convenience and
token benefits.
In Part II, the doctrines underlying the Fourth Amendment are
briefly summarized and discussed to provide a foundation for analyz-
ing whether government data mining of social media sites impinge on
individual civil liberties.  The legal history of law enforcement usage
and acceptability of new technologies as means of gathering evidence
against suspects is also summarized to provide a better understanding
of the role and legality of new-found tactics.  In Part III, the Authors
discuss the origins and consequences of “the Wall” that once existed
between federal law enforcement and national security investigations,
and how national security imperatives accomplished through the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) differ from the traditional
law enforcement missions.  Part IV examines the evolving societal
norms with respect to the increased prevalence and acceptability of
new technology and social media sites. This includes the social and
popular culture aspects as well as the government context and the role
of society’s lowered expectations of privacy in light of increased na-
tional security concerns.  Finally, in Part V, this Article details the ar-
gument that privacy-sacrificing behaviors are creating new social
norms in a way that meaningfully affects the constitutional calculus of
“reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS IN A RAPIDLY
ADVANCING TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
A. Fourth Amendment Foundations and the Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy in the Twentieth Century
The U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment provides basic protec-
tions against government intrusions.12  It reads:
verizon-calls.html; Derek Satya Khanna, The NSA Scandal, NATIONAL REVIEW (June
12, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/350798/nsa-scandal-derek-satya-
khanna?target=author&tid=903246; James Ball, NSA’s Prism Surveillance Program;
How it Works and What it Can Do, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2013), http://www.theguardian
.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-prism-server-collection-facebook-google; Steven Levy,
How the NSA Almost Killed the Internet, WIRED (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.wired.com/
2014/01/how-the-us-almost-killed-the-internet/.
12. U.S. Const. amend IV. See also United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698
(1944) (“[The Fourth Amendment is] directed primarily to the protection of individ-
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.13
The Amendment grew out of a compromise with Anti-Federalists con-
cerned about too powerful a centralized government as a condition
for voting to approve the Constitution that would initially lack a Bill
of Rights.14  Although certain provisions in the Bill of Rights are
clearly directed at cabining the power and intrusiveness of military
forces,15 other protections, such as this one, reach further:  the Fourth
Amendment is “one of the pillars of liberty so necessary to a free
government,” the Second Circuit tells us, “that expediency in law en-
forcement must ever yield to the necessity for keeping the principles
on which it rests inviolate.”16
The Fourth Amendment, however, is not a blanket prohibition on
all governmental searches, but only those warrantless searches that
are deemed “unreasonable.”17  And, along with advances in and the
proliferation of various technologies (particularly communications
and remote-sensing technologies), notions of what constitutes a rea-
sonable warrantless search have changed dramatically in the past
century.
ual and personal rights.”); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) (“[The] law of
searches and seizures . . . is the product of interplay of [the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments].  It reflects dual purpose—protection of privacy of the individual, his right to
be let alone; protection of individual against compulsory production of evidence to be
used against him.”); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (“[R]estraint on govern-
ment conduct [under the Fourth Amendment] generally bars officials from undertak-
ing search or seizure absent individualized suspicion [of wrongdoing].  [P]articularized
exceptions to [this] rule are sometimes warranted based on ‘special needs, beyond
normal need for law enforcement.’”); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) ((quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (“Basic purpose of [the Fourth
Amendment] . . . is to safeguard privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials.”).
13. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
14. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 547, 693–724 (1999); Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection:  Statutory
and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL.’Y 757, 875–81 (2014).
15. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quar-
tered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.”).
16. United States v. 1013 Crates of Empty Old Smuggler Whiskey Bottles, 52 F.2d
49, 50 (2d. Cir. 1931).
17. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (“What Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but
unreasonable searches and seizures.”)); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (quot-
ing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“Fourth Amendment proscribes
all unreasonable searches and seizures, and . . . ‘searches conducted outside judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
Amendment, subject only to few specially established and well delineated
exceptions.’”)).
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A discussion regarding the level of technological innovation permit-
ted for use by law enforcement must begin with the background of the
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Olmstead v. United States.18  The
lead petitioner Roy Olmstead was the head of a twelve-partner boot-
legging conspiracy that employed more than fifty people in an opera-
tion that saw revenues of over $2 million a year (over $27 million in
today’s dollars).19  In 1924, Olmstead and several others were charged
with violating the National Prohibition Act20 based on evidence that
included months of stenographed transcripts from warrantless tele-
phone wiretaps using equipment on telephone poles and in buildings
located elsewhere than on property owned by the defendants.21  Olm-
stead moved to suppress the wiretapping evidence and was denied.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review “the single question
whether the use of evidence of private telephone conversations be-
tween the defendants and others, intercepted by means of wiretap-
ping, amounted to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”22
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Howard Taft found
that, since the government never entered the sacrosanct domain of the
home, the question of the propriety of the government’s actions never
rose to the level of either a search or seizure.23  In holding that there
was not a Fourth Amendment violation, the Court reasoned that the
constitutional right against unreasonable governmental seizure was
akin to a real property right against common law trespass and limited
to physical “things”24 and did not prohibit mere listening in on conver-
sations, even if that listening was accomplished through the use of
technology.25  Note that the government never argued, nor did the
18. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
19. See U.S. Inflation Calculator, COIN NEWS MEDIA GROUP LLC http://www
.usinflationcalculator.com/ (calculating the value of $2,000,000 in 1924, the year in
which the wiretapping of Olmstead and other occurred, see United States v. Olmstead,
7 F.2d 760, 760–62 (D. Wash. 1925), in 2014 dollars) (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
20. National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. 66-66, Stat. Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305-323 (1919).
The law was also known as the Volstead Act, after House of Representatives Judiciary
Committee Chairman, Minnesota Congressman Andrew Volstead.
21. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455–57.
22. Id. at 455.
23. Id. at 464 (“The Amendment does not forbid what was done here.  There was
no searching.  There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense
of hearing and that only.  There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defend-
ants.”).  Declining to extend the exclusionary rule announced in Weeks v. U.S., 232
U.S. 383 (1914), Chief Justice Taft drew a strict physical line around the home, opin-
ing that the Fourth Amendment should not be expanded to capture the “telephone
wires, reaching to the whole world from [someone’s] house or office . . . . [and, as
such,] intervening wires are not part of his house or office, any more than are the
highways along which they are stretched.” Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465.
24. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464 (“The [Fourth] [A]mendment itself shows that the
search is to be of material things—the person, the house, his papers or his effects.”).
25. Id. at 465–66 (“The language of the [Fourth] Amendment cannot be extended
and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from the de-
fendant’s house or office . . . . The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house
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Court suggest that wiretapping did not somehow affect a person’s pri-
vacy interests;26 rather, the issue before the Court merely was whether
wiretapping was an unreasonable search or seizure that would require
a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.  The “right to privacy” as
often asserted today was simply not cognizable in law at that time, and
the Court’s holding was limited accordingly.27
In dissent, however, Justice Louis Brandeis laid the groundwork for
what would become a constitutional right to privacy, cautioning
against a lax standard that would potentially provide the government
with a manner to erode the protections traditionally offered to U.S.
citizens.28  At the same time, Justice Brandeis also recognized that
Congress and the laws must be malleable enough to adapt to legal
realities in a changing world.29  Although earlier constitutional protec-
tions and laws were conceived to protect citizens from physical gov-
ernmental intrusion and trespass, Justice Brandeis presciently
predicted that the wiretapping at issue in Olmstead was only the be-
ginning of potential technological intrusions upon privacy, which he
equated to “individual security.”30
Subsequent decisions affirmed the ability of the government to use
technological means to secure evidence in criminal investigations
without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment,31 and for nearly
a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those
quite outside, and that the wires beyond his house and the messages while passing
over them, are not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–50 (2012) (noting that the
outcome of the Olmstead decision was based on the absence of a physical property
intrusion based approach in the interpretation of finding a Fourth Amendment
search, and not necessarily that notions underlying Fourth Amendment principles
were not implicated).
27. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464 (“The [Fourth] [A]mendment does not forbid what
was done here.  There was no searching.  There was no seizure.  The evidence was
secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.  There was no entry of the
houses or offices of the defendants.”).
28. See id. at 478–79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. See id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“We have likewise held that general
limitations on the powers of government, like those embodied in the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, do not forbid the United States or
the States from meeting modern conditions by regulations which a century ago, or
even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppres-
sive.  Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of
power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world.” (internal
citation and quotation omitted)).
30. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The progress of science in furnishing the
government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.  Ways
may some day be developed by which the government, without removing papers form
secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose
to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.”).
31. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–35 (1940) (holding that
the installation and use of a listening apparatus and detectaphone to pick up and
amplify sound waves from an adjoining office was not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment). But see id. at 136–38 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth
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forty years following, this was the law of the land.  So long as there
was not a physical intrusion or seizure of the defendant, there was not
a per se “search” subject to requirements of judicial issuance of a
search warrant.32
However, the Court eventually chipped away at the requirement of
a physical seizure as a condition-precedent to a violation of a defen-
dant’s Fourth Amendment rights,33 moving toward an understanding
of privacy rights that would constitutionally protect against evidence
gathered through certain electronic surveillance means without war-
rants.34  For instance, in On Lee v. United States, Justice Robert Jack-
son, writing for the majority Court, upheld the government’s use of
evidence collected through a microphone and transmitter secretly
placed on the body of an informant.35  The Court held that neither law
enforcement nor the technology used in the case had “trespassed” on
or “unlawfully seized” the defendant’s person or property, and thus
did not trigger the protections required by the Fourth Amendment.36
Amendment’s protections against unwarranted intrusions includes non-physical intru-
sions, and that the Court should take care to ensure that the spirit of the Fourth
Amendment is maintained in a changing world) (“The conditions of modern life have
greatly expanded the range and character of those activities which require protection
from intrusive action by Government officials. . . . It is our duty to see that this his-
toric provision receives a construction sufficiently liberal and elastic to make it serve
the needs and manners of each succeeding generation”).
32. See generally Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438.
33. As discussed below, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence evolved following
Olmstead, but change was not limited to judicial action.  For instance, the Communi-
cations Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064,1103 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 605) (2012), was noted by the Court in Berger v. New York, to have been a
Congressional reaction to Olmstead and privacy concerns therein, to “specifically pro-
hibit[ ] the interception without authorization and the divulging or publishing of the
contents of telephonic communications.”  Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967).
See also Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382–83 (1937) (holding that federal
law enforcement agents were prohibited under the Communications Act of 1934 from
intercepting telephone messages without the authorization of the sender); Timothy
Casey, Electronic Surveillance and the Right To Be Secure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
977, 986 (2008) (noting that the “Communications Act of 1934, [was] the legislative
response to Olmstead that banned all ‘interception’ of ‘wire communications’”).
34. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (foreshadowing
the concerns raised that advances in science that would potentially permit the gather-
ing of evidence by law enforcement without being in the immediate vicinity of the
target).
35. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952).  Specifically, the govern-
ment used an undercover agent who was wired with a microphone and antennae, to
transmit the conversations between the undercover agents and the defendant, to an
FBI agent listening outside the defendant’s place of business.  Id. at 749.  At the de-
fendant’s trial for narcotics related charges, the government introduced the contents
of the transmitted conversations. Id. at 750.  Over the objections of defense counsel,
the district court held that the use of such evidence did not violate the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights, as this was not considered a “search.” Id. at 751.
36. Id. at 751–53; see also Goldman, 316 U.S. at 129.  The Supreme Court in
Goldman permitted the government to surreptitiously install listening devices and de-
tectaphones in the offices of attorneys suspected of violating the Bankruptcy Act. Id.
at 130–32.  The Court rejected arguments to overrule their decision in Olmstead, and
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL408.txt unknown Seq: 10 11-MAR-16 10:51
728 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
Instead, the Court concluded that no such “trespass” had occurred
since the defendant had by way of invitation consented to the inform-
ant’s presence on his property.37  The Court in On Lee determined
that, without an actual trespass or seizure, it did not matter that ulti-
mately electronic devices were utilized to capture the conversations at
issue in the case.38
The On Lee decision was far from unanimous.  A series of dissents
by Justices William Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, and Harold Burton il-
lustrated deep concerns regarding the government’s exercise of its
electronic abilities.  Justice Frankfurter reiterated Justice Brandeis’
warning in his Olmstead dissent,39 and added that the On Lee case
illustrated “how the rapid advances of science are made available for
that police intrusion into our private lives against which the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution was set on guard.”40  Technological
advancements, wrote Justice Frankfurter, promote “lazy” law enforce-
ment, presumably allowing the government to exercise Constitutional
shortcuts in their data- and evidence-gathering efforts.41  Justice
Douglas’ dissent argued that the Court’s Olmstead decision was incor-
rectly decided, and that the key determinant as to the constitutionality
of law enforcement’s actions and use of technology is not the “nature
of the instrument that science or engineering develops,” but rather
whether there is an invasion of privacy that violates the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments.42
By 1967, the rationale and holding of the Olmstead decision were in
serious danger of being repudiated.  The Court in Berger v. New York
was asked to evaluate the legality of a New York statute that permit-
ted warrantless eavesdropping by law enforcement, including through
use of electronic recording devices.43  The decision traced the history
of eavesdropping, including the development of modern tactics and
instead held that the use of the technology in this case did not exceed that which was
previously approved. Id. at 135–36.
37. On Lee, 343 U.S. at 751–52.
38. Id. at 753.
39. Id. at 759; see also supra note 30.
40. Id. at 759.  Justice Frankfurter voiced significant concerns that sanctioning the
evidence in the On Lee case would have the effect of rewarding “lazy and not alert
law enforcement”, and “led to a deep conviction that these short-cuts in the detection
and prosecution of crime are as self-defeating as they are immoral.” Id. at 761.
41. Id. at 761.
42. Id. at 765.  As noted later in this Article, the increasingly blurred confluence
between technology and privacy considerations makes it more difficult to determine
whether law enforcement’s tactics are consistent with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
43. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 43–44 (1967) (citing N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.
§ 813-a (1958)).  Specifically, evidence regarding bribes for liquor licenses in New
York was obtained through the use of a recording device secreted by an applicant for
such license, was introduced into evidence in the subsequent trial for conspiracy to
bribe the Chairman of the New York State Liquor Authority. Id.; see also supra note
33.
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the use of sophisticated electronic devices capable of transmitting and
recording private conversations for significant distances.44  Of note,
the Berger Court acknowledged the concerns raised by several states
which, on the basis of significant individual privacy implications,
banned the use of surreptitious eavesdropping by mechanical or elec-
tronic device.45
Significantly, the Berger Court did not treat the electronically-ac-
quired evidence as distinct from other types of evidence for the pur-
poses of its Fourth Amendment analysis.46  Instead, the Court
implicitly acknowledged that electronic eavesdropping was subject to
the same Fourth Amendment principles as any other search or
seizure.47  In other words, by treating evidence gathered by electronic
means as no different than any other, the government would be re-
quired to establish probable cause before a proper authority to obtain
warrants both empowering and limiting the scope of the search before
being able to avail itself of the results of such a search.48  Conse-
quently, the Court invalidated the statute as exceeding the limitations
of the Fourth Amendment holding that it failed to mandate the
needed level of particularity as to the scope of the search to justify the
potential intrusion on the privacy of search subjects.49
In a separate concurrence, Justice Douglas further argued against
the use of electronic surveillance and eavesdropping as inherently
conflicting with the Fourth Amendment’s protections for privacy.50
Justice Douglas additionally noted that such devices inherently are
44. Id. at 46–47 (noting that examples of such devices include those “complete
detection systems which automatically record voices under almost any conditions by
remote control;” items which may “increase[ ] the range of these powerful wireless
transmitters to a half mile;” and “combination mirror transmitter[s] . . . which per-
mit[ ] not only sight but voice transmission up to 300 feet”).
45. Id. at 47 (noting that California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada,
New York, and Oregon were states with such statutes).
46. See generally id. at 53–60.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).  In Osborn, the
Supreme Court upheld the use of conversations captured by a secret recording device
on the basis that such use by law enforcement was done only after judges had “au-
thorized the use of a recording device for the narrow and particularized purpose.” Id.
at 330.  The Court noted that the government satisfied the “the procedure of antece-
dent justification before a magistrate” necessary as “a precondition of lawful elec-
tronic surveillance.” Id. (citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464 (1963)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
49. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. at 58 (noting that New York’s statute laid down
no “precise and discriminate requirements,” and instead authorized the “indiscrimi-
nate use of electronic devices as specifically condemned in Osborn” (internal quota-
tions omitted)).  Without such limitations, the statute facilitated the type of
“unauthorized invasions of privacy [and] general searches by electronic devices, the
truly offensive character of which was first condemned in [the 1795 English Law deci-
sion of Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029].”
50. Berger, 388 U.S. at 64 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]here persists my overrid-
ing objection to electronic surveillance, viz., that it is a search for ‘mere evidence’
which, as I have maintained on other occasions, is a violation of the Fourth and Fifth
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nonspecific with respect to what types of information they may record,
and thus would “constitute[ ] a dragnet, sweeping in all conversations
within its scope—without regard to the participants or the nature of
the conversations. . . . [Wiretapping also] intrudes upon the privacy of
those not even suspected of crime and intercepts the most intimate of
conversations.”51  Legislatively barring the introduction of evidence
collected through electronic surveillance except where sufficient prob-
able cause of a crime has occurred would not matter, he believed, be-
cause the search itself would violate civil liberties.52
Two years after the Berger decision, the Court in Katz v. United
States expressly overturned the earlier constitutional standard that
limited the warrant requirement only to protecting against physical
intrusion only and expanded the Fourth Amendment’s protections to
certain conversations that could be overheard with the aid of elec-
tronic eavesdropping equipment.53  In Katz, the Court was asked to
determine whether law enforcement agents’ use of a listening device
attached to a phone booth to record the defendant’s illegal interstate
gambling calls was constitutional.54  As a culmination of years of judi-
cial decisions questioning the use of such tactics, the Court held that
the use of electronic equipment and other technological advances in
government activities would be considered a “search and seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”55 and thus was subject
to the warrant requirement if otherwise unreasonable.  Rejecting the
exclusivity of “constitutionally protected [physical] areas,” the Court
found “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.  What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or of-
fice, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.  But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.”56
Amendments, no matter with what nicety and precision a warrant may be drawn
. . . .”).
51. Id. at 65 (Douglas, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 66 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“But such a [statutory] limitation would not
alter the fact that the order authorizes a general search.  Whether or not the evidence
obtained is used at a trial for another crime, the privacy of the individual has been
infringed by the interception of all of his conversations.  And, even though the infor-
mation is not introduced as evidence, it can and probably will be used as leads and
background information.” (internal citations omitted)).
53. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); see also United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (1971) (“[Katz], however, finally swept away doctrines that
electronic eavesdropping is permissible under the Fourth Amendment unless physical
invasion of a constitutionally protected area produced the challenged evidence.”). Im-
portantly, Olmstead’s limiting factor of physical trespass remains in force as well.
54. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
55. Id. (internal quotations omitted).  Ultimately, the Court overturned the peti-
tioner’s conviction not because of the use of electronic surveillance equipment, but
instead because the government failed to secure a warrant prior to employing the
technology in this case. Id. at 351, 358
56. Id. at 351 (internal citations omitted).
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The “reasonable expectation” concept was articulated in Justice
John Marshall Harlan’s concurrence.  Justice Harlan reasoned that
limiting Fourth Amendment protection to physical penetration of a
premises “is, in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for
reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as
well as physical invasion.”57  In Justice Harlan’s formulation, which
endures to this day, a constitutionally reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy requires, “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”58  In practice, after
Katz many “reasonable expectation” inquiries turned on one’s privacy
interests in what could potentially be generally observable by (a) the
public59 or (b) select third-parties, who generally were commercial en-
tities with whom the defendant had contracted to provide a service.60
Four years after Katz, Justice Douglas cautioned that the use of
electronic surveillance could not be consistent with notions of privacy
in the Fourth Amendment in his vigorous dissent in United States v.
White.61  In White, the defendant was convicted of drug-related crimes
based on evidence collected by a radio transmitter on the body of a
government informant.62  The equipment used in the case transmitted
the defendant’s conversations to government agents hiding in the in-
57. Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 145
n.12 (1978) (“Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source
outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal
property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”).
59. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (maintaining, post-
Katz, the open fields doctrine announced in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924), finding that “open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities
that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or
surveillance”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy where illegal activities can be viewed via flyover in public air-
space); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (same); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
294 (1987) (holding police officer’s use of a flashlight to view the inside of a barn from
an open field does not transform his observations into an unreasonable search).
60. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (no reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy in conversations with third-party police informants, including conver-
sations inside the defendant’s home); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no
protectable Fourth Amendment interest in bank records); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979) (as distinct from wiretaps recording the substance of phone calls,
there is no privacy interest in pen register-generated phone call metadata such as
numbers dialed, time, and duration); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (no
protectable reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed in opaque bags
placed outside of home for pickup by trash collector).
61. White, 401 U.S. at 756–66 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129, 136–38 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[o]ne of the
great boons secured to the inhabitants of this country by the Bill of Rights is the right
of personal privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. . . . [which] protects the
individual against unwarranted intrusions by others into his private affairs”, and that
it was the responsibility of the Court to ensure that the principles provided by the
Fourth Amendment therein could be preserved).
62. Id. at 746–47.
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formant’s home and in the surrounding area.63  The Court’s majority
opinion affirmed the Katz decision and reiterated that the use of elec-
tronic surveillance or intervention as a substitute for physical intrusion
was still considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.64  How-
ever, the White opinion focused not on the use of electronic equip-
ment itself but instead on the Court’s jurisprudence concerning
confidential informants.65  The earlier court of appeals decision inter-
preted the case law in this area as distinguishing contemporaneously
electronically collected evidence from testimony that was gathered by
the informant.66  That was contrary to existing jurisprudence that per-
mitted informants or law enforcement to testify regarding conversa-
tions they had with the defendant.67  Instead, the Court reasoned that
to exclude such recorded evidence simply because it was concurrently
generated by an electronic device seemed to impose an artificial and
illogical distinction.68  The Court therefore concluded that there was
not a Fourth Amendment violation in White, declining to extend the
reasonable expectation of privacy to such discussions.69
Justice Douglas argued in his dissent that the foundational concepts
and principles of privacy laid down by the drafters of the Constitution
would be significantly undermined if the government were permitted
to utilize such electronic technology to eavesdrop.70  Instead, he fur-
63. Id. at 747.
64. Id. at 748.
65. Id. at 749 (citing earlier Supreme Court decisions in Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966), Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), and Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)).
66. White, 401 U.S. at 749–50 (noting that “the Court of Appeals nevertheless
read both Katz and the Fourth Amendment to require a different result if the agent
not only records his conversations with the defendant but instantaneously transmits
them electronically to other agents equipped with radio receivers. Where this occurs,
the Court of Appeals held, the Fourth Amendment is violated and the testimony of
the listening agents must be excluded from evidence”).
67. Id. at 751.
68. Id. (“If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic
equipment do not invade the defendant’s constitutionally justifiable expectations of
privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the same conversations made by the
agent or by others from transmissions received from the agent to whom the defendant
is talking and whose trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks.”).
69. Id. at 752–53.
70. Id. at 756 (Douglass, J., dissenting) (“At the same time the concepts of privacy
which the Founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment vanish completely when we
slavishly allow an all-powerful government, proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and
other benign purposes, to penetrate all the walls and doors which men need to shield
them from the pressures of a turbulent life around them and give them the health and
strength to carry on”).  Justice Douglas’ dissent in White was similar to the concepts
espoused by Justice Murphy in his dissent in Goldman, where he argued that a
“search of one’s home or office no longer requires physical entry, for science has
brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion of a person’s privacy than the
direct and obvious methods of oppression which were detested by our forebears and
which inspired the Fourth Amendment.  Surely the spirit motivating the framers of
[the Fourth] Amendment would abhor these new devices no less.” Goldman, 316
U.S. at 139 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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ther noted that electronic surveillance techniques are fraught with the
possible danger of government agents overstepping traditional notions
and expectations of privacy, and are “almost bound to lead to abuse of
civil rights.”71  Citing Justice William Brennan’s dissent in Katz,72 Jus-
tice Douglas argued that electronic surveillance and new technologies
could still be used appropriately by government officials with the ca-
veat that their use must be consistent with traditional Fourth Amend-
ment protections.73  The protections offered by subjecting law
enforcement to judicial review and the warrant requirement would
provide further assurances against the “arbitrariness of any such”
searches by the government.74  Justice Douglas recognized the danger
of allowing law enforcement officials to be the sole arbiters of the
appropriateness of using electronic surveillance equipment, arguing
that the fundamental principles of a free society weighed in favor of
judicial intervention.75  To allow otherwise would result in the possi-
bility that individuals would constantly be in a state of electronic mon-
itoring and surveillance, which could lead to a significant “chilling
effect on people speaking their minds and expressing their views on
important matters.”76
In a similarly impassioned dissent, Justice Harlan cautioned against
permitting unchecked widespread government use of electronic sur-
veillance techniques.77  Recognizing technology can be an effective
law enforcement tool, he cautioned that courts should proceed “with
specially measured steps in this field.”78
To that end, Justice Harlan argued that the role of the judiciary was
to ensure that the government did not overstep its boundaries in the
pursuit of its law enforcement functions, with search warrants serving
as a prophylactic measure to preserve the citizenry’s private inter-
71. White, 407 U.S. at 757 (discussing FDR’s authorization of wiretaps).
72. Id. at 759–60 (citing Lopez, 373 U.S. 427, 465–66 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
73. Id. at 760 (“I would stand by [the Court’s decisions in] Berger and Katz and
reaffirm the need for judicial supervision under the Fourth Amendment of the use of
electronic surveillance which, uncontrolled, promises to lead us into a police state.”
(footnote omitted)).
74. Id. at 761 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) (“We
simply cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not
needed in [the context of warrantless administrative searches] broad statutory safe-
guards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when those safeguards
may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.”)).
75. Id. at 761–62 (“[T]hese extensive intrusions into privacy made by electronic
surveillance make self-restraint by law enforcement officials an inadequate protec-
tion, that the requirement of warrants under the Fourth Amendment is essential to a
free society.”).
76. Id. at 765.
77. Id. at 769 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78. See generally id. at 769–72 (relaying research by Professor Alan Westin, in his
book Privacy and Freedom, which documented the ability of the government to utilize
then existing technologies to create an “Orwellian Big Brother” scenario (ALAN WES-
TIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 131 (1967)).
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ests.79  This would ensure that people would be able to maintain their
private and intimate discussions “freely, openly and spontaneously”
without worrying that their serendipitously recorded words could be
later construed and analyzed by the government.80  To provide other-
wise would allow law enforcement officials unfettered discretion in
their use of new technologies, which Justice Harlan argued was an un-
tenable scenario.81
As this Article later argues, although the concerns raised by both
Justices Douglas and Harlan in their dissents in White were prescient
in notable ways, the changing nature of privacy, particularly as it re-
lates to social media, has perhaps resulted in a strange dichotomy.82
As discussed further below, the recent perception is that the populace
has become more willing to give up certain aspects of their privacy as
no longer sacrosanct if doing so yields a modicum of perceived addi-
tional convenience in their daily lives.  The relationship between peo-
ple’s assertion of privacy rights with respect to safety and security,
however, is more complex.  As described further below, the public is
inconsistent in its acceptance of the use of certain technologies to
catch criminals and/or to counter national security threats.  Neverthe-
less, how people actually behave makes a difference, at a minimum, to
the objective “reasonableness” in the “reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy” paradigm.
B. The Kyllo Test and Reasonableness as a Function of Technology
Three months to the day before the September 11, 2001, attacks, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United States83 sought to provide
a theoretically sound, but perhaps in practicality a completely un-
workable, sliding scale test for high-tech law enforcement tools.84  At
79. Id. at 789–90 (“The very purpose of interposing the Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement is to redistribute the privacy risks throughout society [and] would
prevent public officials from engaging in [electronic surveillance] unless they first had
probable cause to suspect an individual of involvement in illegal activities and had
tested their version of the facts before a detached judicial officer.”).
80. Id. at 790 (“Interposition of a warrant requirement is designed not to shield
‘wrongdoers,’ but to secure a measure of privacy and a sense of personal security
throughout our society.”).
81. Id. (“The Fourth Amendment does, of course, leave room for the employment
of modern technology in criminal law enforcement, but in the stream of current devel-
opments in Fourth Amendment law I think it must be held that third-party electronic
monitoring, subject only to the self-restraint of law enforcement officials, has no place
in our society.”).
82. See infra Part IV.
83. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
84. Foreshadowing how complicated it would be to set clear rules in an era
marked by dynamic technological developments and how new tech-based tools are
used by both the government and the public, Justice Scalia wrote of his judicial philos-
ophy in 1989:
Just as that manner of textual exegesis facilitates the formulation of general
rules, so does, in the constitutional field, adherence to a more or less
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL408.txt unknown Seq: 17 11-MAR-16 10:51
2015] NATIONAL SECURITY AND KYLLO 735
its core, the Court’s Kyllo opinion tested whether law enforcement
conducts an unreasonable search or seizure as a function of a piece of
technology’s availability to and use by society in general.85  In essence,
technological advances must be widely acceptable and available to the
general populace before the government may employ them without
warrants in their investigations.86
The Kyllo case involved an appellant, Danny Lee Kyllo, who argued
that law enforcement’s use of an external thermal scanner without a
warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights.87  The police sus-
pected that Kyllo was growing marijuana in his residence.  Using a
special thermal scanner capable of detecting infrared energy, law en-
forcement agents performed a scan of Kyllo’s home from across the
street, based on the knowledge that “[i]ndoor marijuana growth typi-
cally requires high-intensity lamps” that radiate a significant amount
of heat.  The resulting scan indicated that the “roof over the garage
and a side wall of [Kyllo’s] home were relatively hot compared to the
rest of the home and substantially warmer than neighboring homes in
the triplex,” indicating a likelihood that high-intensity lights were in
those locations.88  Ultimately, the thermal scanner results, informant
tips, and utility bills were presented to a magistrate judge and used as
the basis for a warrant to search the appellant’s home.89  Kyllo entered
a conditional guilty plea after the trial court denied his motion to sup-
press the thermal scanner results.90
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction on the grounds that the
appellant “had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he
had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home.”91
Furthermore, the court held that “there was no objectively reasonable
originalist theory of construction.  The raw material for the general rule is
readily apparent.  If a barn was not considered the curtilage of a house in
1791 or 1868 and the Fourth Amendment did not cover it then, unlawful
entry into a barn today may be a trespass, but not an unconstitutional search
and seizure.  It is more difficult, it seems to me, to derive such a categorical
general rule from evolving notions of personal privacy.
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1184
(1989).
85. See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Constitutional protections “guaranteeing to the individual protection
against specific abuses of power, must have . . . capacity of adaptation to a changing
world.”); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (“The Fourth Amendment
is to be construed in light of what was deemed unreasonable search and seizure when
it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the
interests and rights of individual citizens.”).
86. Cf. Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 147 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 1945), aff’d 327
U.S. 186 (1946) (The “Fourth Amendment must be construed so as to serve public
interest as well as individual rights.”).
87. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
88. Id. at 29–30.
89. Id. at 30.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 31.
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expectation of privacy because the imager ‘did not expose any inti-
mate details of Kyllo’s life,’ only ‘amorphous “hot spots” on the roof
and exterior wall.’”92
On appeal, the Supreme Court began its discussion of the case by
examining the parameters and criteria for a governmental search that
would require a warrant.93  As a general rule, the Court noted that
“common law trespass”94 or “an actual intrusion into a constitution-
ally protected area”95 was a prerequisite to concluding that a search
triggered Fourth Amendment protections.  Furthermore, the Court
reaffirmed the propriety of law enforcement using purely visual sur-
veillance, since “‘the eye cannot . . . be guilty of a trespass.’”96
Although purely visual surveillance was permissible, the use of
“technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy”97 to allow the
government into people’s homes was beyond what the Court would
permit.98  The right of individuals to feel secure and private in their
own homes was deemed the “minimal expectation of privacy that ex-
ists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable.”99  The use of technol-
ogy to electronically “enter” the home without a warrant was thus an
unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment, particularly
where the technology used was not generally available.100  Further-
more, the Court rejected the government’s arguments that the tech-
nology utilized in the case was benign in that it did not “detect private
activities occurring in private areas” of the home.101  Instead, the
Court announced that in one’s home “all details are intimate details
. . . [with] the entire area . . . held safe from prying government
eyes.”102  Crude technologies could just as easily provide details as to
the intimate activities occurring in the home, and the police could not
ascertain with any level of certainty that their use of technology would
not otherwise intrude on intimate activities.103  “Where . . . the Gov-
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–36; Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464–66).  As the Supreme Court noted in Kyllo, the tres-
pass prerequisite is no longer a necessary requirement to a finding of a search, as
delineated by its decision in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
95. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510–12 (1961).
96. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31–32 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 626, 628
(1886)).  This point was reaffirmed in the Supreme Court’s holding in California v.
Ciraolo where the Court concluded that “the Fourth Amendment protection of the
home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their
eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares.”  California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
97. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
98. Id.
99. Id. (emphasis in original).
100. Id. (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
101. Id. at 37.
102. Id. at 37–38 (emphasis in original).
103. Id. at 38.
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ernment uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore the
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion,” Justice Antonin Scalia concluded, “the
surveillance is a ‘search’ and presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.”104
Writing for the dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and
Anthony Kennedy, argued that the majority’s decision was unneces-
sary in light of existing Fourth Amendment case law and that it in-
stead proffered an “unwise[,] and inconsistent” standard seemingly to
be applied solely in the instance of potential future technological in-
trusions.105  Instead, Justice Stevens argued that existing case law in
this area had consistently upheld the ability for law enforcement to
search property that is in plain public view or that a person “know-
ingly exposes to the public.”106  In this case, the technology did noth-
ing more than show areas of heat emanating from Kyllo’s home, which
the dissent argued could have just as easily been observed from
outside the home.107  Furthermore, the dissent noted that all the po-
lice did in this case was make an inference based on publicly available
information, an action the dissent said was within the bounds of a rea-
sonable search.108
Additionally, the dissent argued that the Court’s standard would
potentially be impracticable when actually applied to the facts of a
case.  Specifically, the dissent was concerned about the inability to
quantify when a piece of new technology proliferates to the point that
104. Id. at 40.
105. Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id. (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488
U. S. 445, 449–50 (1989); California v. Greenwood, 486 U. S. 35, 40–41 (1988); Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U. S. 227, 235–36 (1986); Air Pollution Variance Bd.
of Colo. v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861, 865 (1974)).
107. Id. at 42–43 (“[T]his case involves nothing more than off-the-wall surveillance
by law enforcement officers to gather information exposed to the general public from
the outside of petitioner’s home.  All that the infrared camera did in this case was
passively measure heat emitted from the exterior surfaces of petitioner’s home. . . .
[A]ll that those measurements showed were relative differences in emission levels,
vaguely indicating that some areas of the roof and outside walls were warmer than
others . . . . [N]o details regarding the interior of petitioner’s home were revealed.
Unlike an x-ray scan, or other possible ‘through the-wall’ techniques, the detection of
infrared radiation emanating from the home did not accomplish ‘an unauthorized
physical penetration into the premises,’ nor did it ‘obtain information that it could not
have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house.’”)
108. Id. at 44, 46 (“For the first time in its history, the Court assumes that an infer-
ence can amount to a Fourth Amendment violation . . . . Since what was involved in
this case was nothing more than drawing inferences from off-the-wall surveillance,
rather than any ‘through-the-wall’ surveillance, the officers’ conduct did not amount
to a search and was perfectly reasonable.”).
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its warrantless use by law enforcement would be reasonable.109  Jus-
tice Stevens warned that “it seems likely that the threat to privacy will
grow, rather than recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes
more readily available.”110  The dissent further argued that under the
Court’s ruling, new technologies that would serve as substitute means
of investigation that would ordinarily be constitutional in nature (e.g.,
a mechanical means of drug detection in lieu of a drug-sniffing dog)
could be deemed impermissible regardless of how limited the scope of
the information that may be provided.111
Revisiting concerns and comments raised by its earlier case law and
jurisprudence, the Court in Kyllo recognized that it faced much diffi-
culty in balancing the constitutional rights of the people with the gov-
ernment’s ability to utilize new technologies for law enforcement
purposes without a warrant.  In doing so, the Court specifically at-
tempted to articulate a rubric for future courts to apply when grap-
pling with difficult decisions as to the reasonableness of employing
such new technologies.  However, as the following Section illustrates,
in practice, various applications of Kyllo’s test has often yielded curi-
ous results.
C. Modern Applications of Kyllo
In many ways, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo did not tread
new ground.  As discussed previously, the Court had already wrestled
with deciding when emerging technologies such as wiretaps and elec-
tronic voice recorders may be used without a warrant to collect infor-
mation in support of law enforcement.  But since case law is always
reactionary in that it develops based on specific sets of facts, it is
sometimes difficult to apply general legal principles in sui generis situ-
ations, particularly in areas where legal determinations are subject to
a reasonableness standard, where there looms the possibility that the
determination could reflect what judges think is reasonable, versus
objective social standards.  The Court’s opinion in Kyllo sought to
provide generalizable standards and guidelines for law enforcement’s
use of technology that is constantly pushing boundaries, partially be-
cause of resourcing constraints, and partially in response to the de-
mands of catching more sophisticated criminals.  In theory, courts
could apply Kyllo’s test to determine whether law enforcement’s im-
plementation of novel or advanced technological methodologies have
intruded on areas viewed as sacrosanct.112  In practice, nuanced fac-
109. Id. at 47 (arguing that the majority opinion did not quantify as to “how much
use [of certain new technology] is general public use” for a determination as to what is
reasonable).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 47–48.
112. But see Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954, 962 (2012) (in concurring
opinions by Justices Sotomayor and Alito, both Justices noted the importance of
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tual differences, subjective assessments of what is most relevant in any
given fact pattern, and the rapid pace at which modern technology
proliferates have made it difficult to develop a cohesive body of juris-
prudence in this area, where, for example, people’s use of communica-
tions technology subjects their exchanges to outside scrutiny, and
police use of certain tracking technologies arguably mimics traditional
law enforcement methods.
In City of Ontario v. Quon,113 the Supreme Court grappled with
whether individuals have any privacy rights in digital or text
messages.114  In an effort to help its police officers rapidly mobilize in
response to emergency situations, the city government issued its police
officers alphanumeric pagers.115  During the next few months, Quon
exceeded the limits included in his pager’s monthly plan and had to
reimburse the city for the excess charges.116  After another overuse
period, the city decided to audit Quon’s messages to determine
whether the bulk of the messages were for work or for personal pur-
poses.117  The audit found that the large majority of the text messages
sent during the workday were non-work related and were sexually ex-
plicit in nature.118  In accordance with prior warnings that text
messages sent through the pagers would be treated the same as work
emails, meaning that the government could audit and read those
messages without notice, Quon was disciplined for the conduct.119
At issue was whether a city government could validly read the text
messages sent from its pagers without violating the employee’s Fourth
Amendment rights.120  The Ninth Circuit held that Quon had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in his communications, and the war-
rantless city audit would therefore be unconstitutional unless no “less
weighing prevailing societal valuations of privacy in the calculus of evaluating
whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred).
113. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
114. Id. at 750.
115. Id. at 750–51.
116. Id. at 752.
117. Id. at 752–53.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 751–53.  In fact, the city’s computer use policy specifically dictated that it
“reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and In-
ternet use, with or without notice.  Users should have no expectation of privacy or
confidentiality when using these resources.” Id. at 751.  While text messages were not
explicitly covered under the policy, officers were informed “that the City would treat
text messages the same way as it treated e-mails.” Id.
120. Id. at 754.  While recognizing that the respondent had an expectation of pri-
vacy in the messages, the district court held the city’s audit did not violate any Fourth
Amendment rights since the audit was not conducted for the purpose of snooping into
the content of the respondent’s messages, but rather to determine whether the city
needed to increase its allocated usage.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed in part,
finding the respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages and
that the search conducted by the city had exceeded what would be a reasonable scope.
Id.
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intrusive means were feasible” than the manner in which the search
was conducted.121
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed.122  The
Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment is not limited only to
criminal matters, but protects citizens (including government employ-
ees) from governmental searches regardless of the context.123  And,
recognizing that it was wading into an area whose ramifications that
had not yet fully been realized, the Court noted that it was not well
equipped to dictate what would be considered a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in this context.124  Nonetheless, assuming arguendo
that there existed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text
messages, the Court still found no Fourth Amendment violation be-
cause the purpose of the search and its limited scope was
reasonable.125
Specifically, the Court held that the city was justified in trying to
determine if the text messaging plan was insufficient for the city’s
needs and that  reviewing the messages was the most “efficient and
expedient way to determine whether Quon’s overages were the result
of work-related messaging or personal use.”126  Furthermore, the re-
view of the messages was limited to the most recent two-month period
and only those messages sent during the workday.127  Noting that the
city had explicitly informed police officers that the messages were sub-
ject to review and that Quon’s law enforcement background should
have provided him with an understanding that his actions were subject
to review, the Court rejected arguments that the messages were “im-
mune from scrutiny.”128  The Fourth Amendment does not require
121. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F. 3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008).
122. Id. at 764–65.
123. Id. at 755–56 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (“[The] Fourth Amendment’s protection extends
beyond the sphere of criminal investigations”), and Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989) (“The Amendment guarantees the privacy,
dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers
of the Government, without regard to whether the government actor is investigating
crime or performing another function.”)).
124. Id. at 759–60 (“[T]he Court would have difficulty predicting how employees’
privacy expectations will be shaped by those changes or the degree to which society
will be prepared to recognize those expectations as reasonable.”).
125. Id. at 761.  Specifically, citing the framework in its earlier decision in
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court noted that a government search is
permissible if it is “‘justified at its inception’ and if ‘the measures adopted are reason-
ably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of”
the circumstances giving rise to the search.” Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 761–62.
128. Id. at 762.
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that the government always utilize the least intrusive means of con-
ducting a search, but merely that the search was reasonable.129
Law enforcement’s use of global positioning system (“GPS”) track-
ers has also been the subject of much litigation.  In one such case,
United States v. Cuevas-Perez, the Seventh Circuit was asked to decide
an appeal regarding the suppression of evidence gathered by a GPS
device without a warrant.130  Suspecting the defendant was engaged in
a drug distribution enterprise, law enforcement agents had attached a
GPS device to his car without a warrant to track the location of his
vehicle every four minutes.131  After failing on his suppression motion,
the defendant entered a conditional guilty plea for drug distribu-
tion.132  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding that the
warrantless use of the GPS tracker did not violate the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights.133  Citing prior precedents involving GPS
technology,134 the court in Cuevas-Perez concluded that the use of
GPS tracking in this instance was limited in scope and did not exceed
the bounds permitted under the Fourth Amendment.135  The court
held that the defendant was tracked for only a “single trip” and, there-
fore, did not rise to the type of consistent ongoing surveillance that
was deemed to be a search.136
Nonetheless, the court in Cuevas-Perez acknowledged that “the
meaning of a Fourth Amendment search must change to keep pace
with the march of science”137 to avoid potential overreach by the gov-
ernment and law enforcement.138  While recognizing that perhaps fu-
ture forms of GPS tracking in the wrong hands may lead to “abuses fit
for a dystopian novel,” the court ultimately determined that the type
of information that was collected in this case was readily available to
the public (i.e., obtainable by observation from public streets, as with
129. Id. at 763 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–57 (1995)
(noting that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly refused to declare that only the ‘least
intrusive’ search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”)).
130. United States v. Cuevas–Perez, 640 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct.
1534 (2012).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 273.
133. Id. at 276.
134. Id. at 273–74 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that
the use of a beeper device to track a person on public highways was not a Fourth
Amendment search, as there was no expectation of privacy as to a person’s move-
ments on such roads); United States v. Garcia, 747 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding
that there was not a search through the use of GPS trackers which is akin to camera
surveillance and satellite imaging which do not fall under the categorization of search
under the Fourth Amendment). But cf. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (holding that the warrantless use of a GPS device for an extended period of
twenty-eight days may be a Fourth Amendment violation)).
135. Id. at 276.
136. Id. at 274–75.
137. Id. at 275 (citing Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997).
138. Id. at 275–76.
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traditional law enforcement surveillance) and thus relatively
benign.139
In light of a circuit split on the issue, the Supreme Court the follow-
ing year addressed the propriety of the government’s attachment of a
GPS device on a suspect’s car to track his movements in a drug distri-
bution investigation in United States v. Jones.140  Although in this case
the government did have a valid warrant to install the GPS device,
government agents failed to install the device on the car within the
time period and within the jurisdiction of the stated bounds of the
warrant.141  The GPS device ultimately provided the government with
twenty-eight days of data detailing the car’s location and travels, infor-
mation which was ultimately used to support the charges that the de-
fendant was involved in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine.142
Though the Court’s opinion in Kyllo required consideration of the
contemporary role of the technology being used, which might suggest
the ubiquitous nature of GPS to be a relevant factor, the Jones deci-
sion reminded that the foundational underpinnings of the Fourth
Amendment cannot be ignored.  The majority opinion in Jones found
that, irrespective of the expectations of privacy at the time of a search,
the Fourth Amendment provides a fundamental minimal level of pro-
tection against unreasonable searches.143  As it had done eighty-four
years earlier in Olmstead, the Court in Jones held that the physical
intrusion on the defendant’s property and person was sufficient to
trigger Fourth Amendment protections, independent of the state of
the technology employed to conduct the search;144 unlike in Olmstead,
here the Court found that the government had encroached on a “con-
stitutionally protected area.”145  In fact, although the technological
means used to track the defendant were central to the facts of the
139. Id. (noting that the information that was collected by law enforcement was
“real-time information . . . that drivers make available by traversing public roads”).
140. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 953 (the standard the Court “appl[ies] is an 18th-century guarantee
against unreasonable searches, which we believe must provide at a minimum the de-
gree of protection it afforded when it was adopted,” not the concurrence’s suggestion
to “apply exclusively Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, even when that
eliminates rights that previously existed.”).
144. Id. (noting that “situations involving merely the transmission of electronic sig-
nals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis”).  In her concurrence to
the Jones decision, Justice Sotomayor recognizes that in certain circumstances, the use
of GPS tracking may affect how courts apply the test laid out in Katz, since the tech-
nology permits law enforcement to tacitly collect a wide range of information about
the subject of the tracking and their movements.  Id. at 956.  Such collected informa-
tion could then be data mined and analyzed by the government to ascertain often very
personal aspects of someone’s life, without there ever having been a physical intru-
sion. Id.
145. Id. at 951–52.
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Jones case, the level of advancement in the technology was scarcely
mentioned as a determining factor in the majority’s decision.146
The Court further declined to consider how long a suspect could be
tracked with GPS before the tracking would be considered a search
(i.e., rejecting the Seventh Circuit’s “single trip” factor in Cuevas-Pe-
rez).147  The Court held that it would seem illogical to find “that ‘rela-
tively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public
streets’” is acceptable, “but that ‘the use of longer term GPS monitor-
ing in investigations of most offenses’ is no good.”148 To find otherwise
could effectively prohibit law enforcement from using such technology
in cases in which the very nature of the conduct being investigated
requires longer periods of surveillance.149
In her concurrence in Jones, Justice Sonia Sotomayor described her
concerns as to the “premise that an individual has no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third par-
ties,” particularly in today’s society where “people reveal a great deal
of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carry-
ing out mundane tasks” such as phone numbers, websites visited, gro-
ceries purchased, etc.150  Much like the majority’s observation that
bright-line rules may not be appropriate in all cases of GPS use, Jus-
tice Sotomayor further warned against the notion that private infor-
mation provided by people to third parties for certain discrete
purposes does not necessarily mean that the desire for privacy for that
information has been waived in all instances.151
A step beyond GPS tracking of a suspect’s vehicle is the alleged
ability to conduct audio surveillance of him using his own cell phone
as a surreptitious microphone.  In United States v. Oliva,152 the Ninth
Circuit considered a defendant’s arguments that law enforcement had
turned his cellular phone into a “roving bug” capable of listening in on
conversations even when the phone is not actively connected to a
call.153  Under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (“Omnibus Act”),154 federal law enforcement officers are re-
quired to obtain judicial authorization to “intercept wire, oral and
electronic communication.”155  These authorizations may either be
146. See generally id. at 954.
147. Id. at 954.
148. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring)).
149. Id. (noting that “there ‘is no precedent for the proposition that whether a
search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being investigated’”).
150. Id. at 957; see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring).
151. Id.
152. United States v. Oliva, 705 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 2012).
153. Id. at 394, 397.
154. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012) [hereinafter Omnibus Act].
155. Oliva, 705 F.3d at 394.  As the court’s decision notes, among the requirements
promulgated by the Omnibus Act in the government’s application for a valid authori-
zation is “a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL408.txt unknown Seq: 26 11-MAR-16 10:51
744 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
“standard,” meaning covering a distinct location, or “roving,” cover-
ing a particular person.156  Because roving intercepts are more intru-
sive and capture any communications regardless of the target’s
location, the statute requires heightened application requirements.157
In Oliva, the government sought and received electronic surveil-
lance orders to intercept background conversations that could be
heard from cellular phones carried by the defendant and other sub-
jects.158  Oliva moved unsuccessfully to suppress the evidence that he
claimed came from roving bugs unauthorized by the orders.  Upon
government representations that no evidence in the case came from
“background conversations from cellular telephones that were pow-
ered on, but not connected to . . . a live call,”159 the recorded conver-
sations gathered from the challenged intercepts were used in the
underlying criminal trial and led to the defendant’s conviction for
drug trafficking.160
The Ninth Circuit’s evaluation of how to address the government’s
inclusion of the words “off the hook” in its application for intercept
authorization is of particular interest.161  Although landline phones
have “hooks” that allow for the connection or disconnection of the
receiver and transmitter from the telephone line,162 cell phones have
no such mechanism and instead rely on software to mimic this func-
tionality.  Under the language of the Omnibus Act, the failure of the
government to succinctly and clearly define the scope of the authori-
zation sought could have invalidated any resulting intercepts.163  How-
ever, the court ultimately held that even if the defendant’s reading of
the orders in this case was accepted, no evidence was collected under
such circumstances, making the arguable failure of the orders’ lan-
which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted” so that the court
can evaluate whether there is sufficient probable cause that the location being investi-
gated has some relation to a crime. Id. at 395 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(ii)).
156. Id. at 396.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.  The court in Oliva did acknowledge that the language contained in the
government’s application for the intercepts under the Omnibus Act (“[B]ackground
conversations intercepted in the vicinity of [a target phone number] while the tele-
phone is off the hook or otherwise in use. . .”) was sufficient to capture the type of
remote surreptitious eavesdropping that the defendant argued had occurred in this
case. Id.
160. Id. at 394, 397–98.  While the government did not confirm that such technol-
ogy existed, nor did the court make a determination as to the defendant’s contentions,
the court noted that such technologies were the subject of a 2006 news article, and a
case from the Southern District of New York. Id. at 398 (citing Declan McCullagh &
Anne Broache, FBI taps cell phone mic as eavesdropping tool, CNET (Dec. 1, 2006),
http://news.cnet.com/FBI-taps-cell-phone-mic-as-eavesdropping-tool/2100-1029_3-
6140191.html; United States v. Tomero, 462 F. Supp. 2d 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
161. Id. at 398–99.
162. Id. at 398 (citing CYRIL M. JANSKY & DANIEL C. FABER, PRINCIPLES OF THE
TELEPHONE 5 (1916)).
163. See id. at 400.
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guage to meet statutory requirements harmless error.164  Despite not
evaluating the propriety of new or emerging technologies in light of
Kyllo, the court recognized the need for and importance of specificity
and clarity to avoid future similar situations, and to “take account of
more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development.”165
Finally, law enforcement agents’ use of software to locate a com-
puter that had been connecting to a neighbor’s WiFi network to facili-
tate the exchange of child pornography gave rise to United States v.
Stanley in the Third Circuit.166  During the district court proceedings,
the defendant argued that the use of the software to conduct the
search was unlawful under Kyllo.167  The district court rejected this
argument, finding that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in
the WiFi signal that his computer sent out of the home, particularly
where affirmative actions by the defendant were necessary to initiate
the signal.168  On appeal, while the Third Circuit acknowledged that
the technology in this case in some ways mirrored the technology used
in Kyllo (e.g., it was sense enhancing, examined into the interior of the
defendant’s home, and was not generally available technology),169 the
court nonetheless found the search valid because the defendant made
no efforts to limit his illegal activities to the interior of his home.170
The court therefore declined to extend defendant’s claimed privacy
rights to the signal simply because it was initiated from his home and,
further noted that the unauthorized Internet signal was not something
society would consider to be subject to a reasonable expectation of
privacy.171
III. FISA AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY “WALL”
Importantly, the fact patterns of every case discussed above are
what can colloquially be considered “regular,” “traditional,” even
“standard” criminal cases, and thus the Fourth Amendment jurispru-
164. Id. at 399–400.
165. Id. at 399 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36).
166. U.S. v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2014).  In Stanley, police used
“MoocherHunter” software in conjunction with a laptop and directional antennae to
locate and track back the unique signal being sent out by the defendant’s computer to
the defendant’s apartment complex. Id. at 117.  After narrowing the presumed loca-
tion of the signal to the defendant’s home, police secured a search warrant for the
home and found the defendant’s computer, which matched the specifications of the
computer connecting to the neighbor’s WiFi router. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 117–18.
169. Id. at 119.
170. Id. at 120.
171. Id. at 120–21.
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dence is properly understood to apply in that context.172  None of
those cases dealt with national security, intelligence, or counterterror-
ism investigations.  The Supreme Court even expressly reserved the
question of national security cases as separate and apart from its
Fourth Amendment holding in Katz.173  Indeed, in the twentieth cen-
tury, only one Supreme Court opinion addressed the constitutionality
of intelligence surveillance head-on174—the 1972 case United States v.
U.S. District Court,175 commonly known as “the Keith case,” named
after Judge Damon Keith, the U.S. district judge subject to the man-
damus petition litigated all the way to the high court.  In the underly-
ing case, the government had charged three members of the radical
White Panther Party with conspiracy to destroy government property;
one of them, Lawrence Plamondon was also charged with bombing an
office of the Central Intelligence Agency in Michigan.176  Some evi-
dence in the case was obtained via warrantless electronic surveillance.
Judge Keith found that such surveillance violated the Fourth Amend-
ment, notwithstanding provisions of the Omnibus Act,177 passed in
part as a response to the Katz decision the year before, that expressly
exempted from the warrant requirement investigations targeting for-
eign powers and those who attempt to overthrow the government by
violence or illegal means.178  He ordered the government to disclose
172. The Supreme Court has distinguished “ordinary crime” from cases involving
security concerns. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322
(1972).
173. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 n.23.
174. In Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), the Supreme Court found that
U.S. Army intelligence personnel’s physical intrusion into the barracks of the defen-
dant violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.  Although this case did in-
volve intelligence, rather than law enforcement personnel, the Fourth Amendment
finding was based upon the physical intrusion and trespass, rather than remote or
electronic surveillance.  Opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC), under the framework of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(FISA), are discussed below.
175. Keith, 407 U.S. 297.
176. Id. at 299–300.
177. Omnibus Act, Pub. L. 90-351.
178. Id. at § 2511(3) (“Nothing contained in this chapter [generally prohibiting,
subject to criminal prosecution, wiretapping or surveilling communications without a
warrant] or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1143; 47
U.S.C. 605) shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures
as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other
hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security informa-
tion against foreign intelligence activities.  Nor shall anything contained in this chap-
ter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such
measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of
the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and
present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.  The contents of any
wire or oral  communication intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise
of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in any trial hearing, or other
proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise
used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power.”).
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to the defense the relevant materials concerning the monitored com-
munications.  In so ruling, Judge Keith wrote:
An idea which seems to permeate much of the Government’s argu-
ment is that a dissident domestic organization is akin to an un-
friendly foreign power and must be dealt with in the same fashion.
There is great danger in an argument of this nature for it strikes at
the very constitutional privileges and immunities that are inherent
in United States citizenship.179
The government sought a writ of mandamus from the Sixth Circuit
to order Judge Keith to vacate his order; the Court of Appeals denied
the petition.180  The Supreme Court, after determining Congress had
not legislated with respect to national security surveillance,181 applied
the Fourth Amendment to domestic surveillance for domestic security
purposes182 and affirmed the intermediate court’s decision.  The Court
expressly reserved the question of the Fourth Amendment’s applica-
bility to foreign intelligence surveillance.183
179. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1079 (D. Mich. 1971).  In arguing
the surveillance was both lawful and non-discoverable in this and other cases at the
time, see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Cal. 1971), the govern-
ment relied heavily on historic executive branch practice in exercise of the President’s
national security powers, in particular a confidential 1940 memorandum by President
Roosevelt authorizing the Attorney General to allow warrantless wiretapping in lim-
ited instances. Smith, 321 F. Supp. at 431 (“You are, therefore, authorized and di-
rected in such cases as you may approve, after investigation of the need in each case,
to authorize the necessary investigation agents that they are at liberty to secure infor-
mation by listening devices direct to the conversation or other communications of
persons suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the United
States . . . .”).  For the complete text and subsequent history of, and more thorough
discussions about the Roosevelt directive, see Smith, 321 F. Supp. 427–32; Neal K.
Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the NSA
Surveillance Program:  The FDR Precedent, 60 STANFORD L. REV. 1023 (2008).
180. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1971), aff’d, 407 U.S.
297 (1972).
181. Keith, 407 U.S. at 306.
182. Id. at 320 (“[W]e do not think a case has been made for the requested depar-
ture from Fourth Amendment standards.  The circumstances described do not justify
complete exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior judicial scrutiny.
Official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or ongoing intelli-
gence gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally protected privacy of speech.
Security surveillances are especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness of the
domestic security concept, the necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence
gathering, and the temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent.
We recognize, as we have before, the constitutional basis of the President’s domestic
security role, but we think it must be exercised in a manner compatible with the
Fourth Amendment.  In this case we hold that this requires an appropriate prior war-
rant procedure.”).
183. Id. at 321–22 (“We emphasize, before concluding this opinion, the scope of our
decision.  As stated at the outset, this case involves only the domestic aspects of na-
tional security.  We have not addressed and express no opinion as to, the issues which
may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents.  Nor does
our decision rest on the language of [§] 2511(3) or any other section of Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.  That Act does not attempt to
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Shortly thereafter, the New York Times began publishing articles
concerning what would become known as the CIA’s Family Jewels—a
series of internal reports by the CIA’s own personnel that alleged
wrongdoing within the agency, including certain surveillance prac-
tices.184  Several oversight bodies were quickly established within the
government, including the President’s Commission on CIA Activities
within the United States (known as the Rockefeller Commission,
named after its chair Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, which in-
cluded in its membership future President Ronald Reagan), the Pike
Committee in the House of Representatives, and the Church Commit-
tee in the Senate,185 all of which compiled evidence and some of which
issued reports on deemed “CIA abuses.”
This combination of events led to the passage of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”),186 which, among other
things, created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”)
to oversee government surveillance of wire communications.187  This
statutory regime requires the government to obtain a FISC order, not
define or delineate the powers of the President to meet domestic threats to the na-
tional security.”).
184. Seymour M. Hersch, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar
Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974, at 1, 26; Karen
DeYoung and Walter Pincus, CIA to Air Decades of Its Dirty Laundry, WASH. POST
(June 22, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/21/
AR2007062102434.html.
185. The latter two were the precursors to House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, respectively, which
would be formally created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  Both
before and after FISA, the Department of Justice also promulgated a series of guide-
lines that would govern how the FBI conducted security investigations.  For a discus-
sion on the most important of these, see William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman,
Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 68–74
(2000).
186. Pub. L. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1783, 50 U.S.C. ch. 36.  Although this Article discusses
electronic surveillance only, since 1994, FISA also governs certain physical searches
for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information. See Intelligence Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, 108 Stat. 3423 § 302(a)(1)
(1994) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1822 (Supp. IV 1998)).  For a thorough
discussion on FISA’s history and parameters prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks,
see Banks & Bowman, supra note 185.  This excellent article was published less than a
year prior to the 9/11 attacks by recognized national security law scholar Professor
Banks, and former senior FBI lawyer Spike Bowman.  As such, it reflects great schol-
arship, though readers should be aware that, because of its timing and the sensitivities
of its subject matter, its completeness was limited to unclassified information.  As
noted below, important regulations concerning the sharing of information between
intelligence and law enforcement personnel, critical to understanding certain aspects
of how certain collected intelligence may be used, were classified at that time.  It is
nevertheless a commendable article that serves as a learned primer on the status of
foreign intelligence surveillance at that time.
187. Several states also passed laws restricting police monitoring of political and
other groups. See, e.g., Matthew Waxman, Police and National Security:  American
Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT. SEC. L. & POL’Y
377, 397 (2009).
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a warrant, in certain instances where it desires to collect foreign intel-
ligence information.188  As originally defined, “foreign intelligence in-
formation” means:
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States
person is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect
against—
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power;189 or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service
or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign
power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory
that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary
to—
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.190
Such information may be collected under FISA against targets for
which or whom there is probable cause191 to believe they are a “for-
eign power”192 or “agent of a foreign power.”193  Targets were gener-
ally envisioned to be foreign governments or people working on their
188. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2012).
189. Subsection (e)(1)(B) has since been amended to include information relating
to protection against international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. See
50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(B) (2012).
190. See Pub. L. 95-511 at § 101(e) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)).
191. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a).
192. As defined in the original version of FISA, “foreign power” meant:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not rec-
ognized by the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of
United States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or gov-
ernments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or
governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation
therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of
United States persons; or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or
governments.
Pub. L. 95-511 § 101(a).
193. FISA’s original definition of “agent of a foreign power” was:
(1) any person other than a United States person, who—
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power,
or as a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a) (4);
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine
intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the
United States, when the circumstances of such person’s presence in the
United States indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the
United States, or when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in
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behalf against the interests of the United States, either inside its bor-
ders or overseas.  At the same time, the statute accounted for
“group[s] engaged in international terrorism,”194 although establishing
that a group qualified for that designation was not straightforward.
As the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General
(“OIG”) explained:
Whether a terrorist organization qualified as a “foreign power”
under the FISA statute depended upon the intelligence developed
about the group and its activities, and whether the FISA Court was
convinced that the government had proven that the entity existed
and was engaged in international terrorist activities.  In practice,
once the FBI developed the necessary intelligence about the exis-
tence of a terrorist organization, a particular subject was used as a
“test subject” for pleading to the FISA Court that the organization
was a foreign power.  Although not dispositive, FISA applications
might reference the fact that the State Department had designated
an entity as a “foreign terrorist organization” [under the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132
§ 302].195
the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires with any person to en-
gage in such activities; or
(2) any person who—
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for
or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a
violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a
foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activ-
ities for or on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are
about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities
that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power; or
(D) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities de-
scribed in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any
person to engage in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
Id. at § 101(b).
194. Id. at § 101(a)(4).  “International terrorism” was and still is defined in the stat-
ute as activities that:
(1) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or
any State;
(2) appear to be intended—
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping;
and
(3) occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national bounda-
ries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they
appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpe-
trators operate or seek asylum.
Id. at § 101(c).
195. A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the Sep-
tember 11 Attacks (Unclassified Version), UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
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Furthermore, FISA required a Senate-confirmed official to certify
that the purpose of surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence in-
formation196 and included additional safeguards for United States per-
sons, including that they could not become surveillance targets “solely
upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment.”197
Despite the safeguards, the regime codified by FISA was never
meant to mimic the Fourth Amendment standards that would be ap-
plied in criminal cases.  Although Congress “anticipated that evidence
of criminal conduct uncovered during FISA surveillance would be
provided to criminal investigators,”198 concerns arose within the De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”) when criminal defendants began to chal-
lenge prosecutors’ use of information collected pursuant to FISA
orders.199  Thus, in the 1980s, DOJ began to limit prosecutors’ in-
volvement in intelligence investigations to help ensure it could prove
in court that any FISA-derived evidence used was collected in the
course of an investigation whose “primary purpose” was intelligence
collection.200  This measure was designed with the idea of keeping
criminal prosecutions untainted by intelligence gathering methods,
notwithstanding the deference Courts of Appeals implicitly afforded
FISC judges in their determinations about the purpose of the surveil-
lance when issuing their orders.201
During the investigation into Aldrich Ames’ espionage activities in
1993–1994, DOJ’s office that litigated FISA applications, the Office of
Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), became “concerned that no
guidelines governed the contacts” between DOJ’s Criminal Division
and the FBI.202  A series of memoranda from OIPR proposed the for-
mal creation of a “wall” between not only intelligence investigators
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 45–46 (2006), available at http://fas.org/irp/
agency/doj/oig/fbi-911/ [hereinafter DOJ OIG REPORT].
196. Pub. L. 95-511 § 104(a)(7) (codified at 50 USC § 1804(a)(7)).
197. Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A).
198. DOJ OIG REPORT, supra note 195, at 22 (citing S. 1566, 95th Congress, 2d
Session, Report 95-701, Mar. 14, 1978); see also United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59,
78 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Congress recognized that in many cases the concerns of govern-
ment with respect to foreign intelligence will overlap with those with respect to law
enforcement.”).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Johnson, 952
F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1991).
200. See DOJ OIG REPORT, supra note 195, at 22.
201. See also Banks & Bowman, supra note 185, at 84–85 (“Although the surveil-
lance in each [case in which criminal defendants raised challenges to the purpose of
the surveillance used when gathering evidence against them] was conducted by the
FBI, rather than one of the pure intelligence agencies, the government’s defense of its
surveillance was aided by the prophylactic protection afforded by a FISC judge’s prior
approval of the surveillance.”); DOJ OIG REPORT, supra note 195, at 27 (describing a
January 1995 opinion of DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel that noted the courts “had
shown great deference to the government in challenges to evidence gathered through
intelligence searches that was used in criminal prosecutions”).
202. DOJ OIG REPORT, supra note 195, at 25.
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and prosecutors but also between intelligence and criminal investiga-
tors within the FBI.203  During the subsequent development and draft-
ing of intelligence sharing procedures, significant tumult resulted
between OIPR, the Criminal Division, and the FBI,204 as well as the
United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New
York (“SDNY”) and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General.205
The latter development resulted from a memorandum sent by Deputy
Attorney General Jamie Gorelick to United States Attorney Mary Jo
White in the midst of the SDNY’s investigation into Omar Abdel-
Rahman and the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.206  Gore-
lick wrote that “during the course of [the Rahman and related
counterterrorism] investigations significant counterintelligence infor-
mation [had] been developed relating to the activities and plans of
agents of foreign powers operating in this country and overseas, in-
cluding previously unknown connections between separate terrorist
groups.”207  It was thus decided to “initiate[ ] a separate full field
counterintelligence investigation,” which led Gorelick to inform
White that the pen registers then in place in SDNY’s criminal investi-
gation would be discontinued, and all FBI memoranda and investiga-
tive reports would be segregated and those relating to potential future
attacks would not be provided to criminal investigative agents or pros-
ecutors.208  “These procedures,” Gorelick noted, “go beyond what is
legally required.”209
In response, White wrote directly to Attorney General Janet Reno
that “the FBI labels of an investigation as intelligence or law enforce-
ment can be quite arbitrary” and that “the most effective way to com-
bat terrorism is with as few labels and walls as possible.”210  In
response to the draft instructions shared with her, White said:
203. Id. at 26.
204. See id.
205. See generally FURTHER INTERNAL JUSTICE DEPT CORRESPONDENCE FROM
1995 ON THE SEPARATION OF CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND CRIMI-
NAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND THE ROLE OF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL GORELICK,
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (released Apr. 2004) [hereinafter DOJ CORRESPONDENCE] (com-
piling a series of memoranda between DOJ and United States Attorney Mary Jo
White concerning the draft procedures, declassified by James Baker, the Counsel for
Intelligence Policy, on April 10, 2004), available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/
1995_wall.pdf.
206. Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Att’y Gen. to May. Jo White,
U.S. Att’y S.D.N.Y., et al. in DOJ CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 205 (discussing in-
structions on separation of certain foreign counterintelligence and criminal
investigations).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 3.
209. Id. at 2.
210. Memorandum from Mary Jo White, U.S. Att’y S.D.N.Y. to Janet Reno, U.S.
Att’y Gen. in DOJ CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 205 (discussing Instructions on for-
eign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence Investigations).
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It is hard to be totally comfortable with instructions to the FBI
prohibiting contact with the United States Attorney’s Offices when
such prohibitions are not legally required.  These instructions leave
entirely to OIPR and the Criminal Division when, if ever, to contact
affective U.S. Attorneys on investigations including terrorism and
espionage. . . .
. . . [T]here should be an obligation on the Criminal Division so that
U.S. Attorneys are made aware of potential criminal activity in their
districts at the earliest possible—and permissible— time.”211
Accepting some of White’s suggestions and rejecting others, the At-
torney General formally adopted a set of intelligence-sharing proce-
dures a month later, requiring that OIPR and the Criminal Division
each had to concur with an FBI field office’s request to inform its
respective U.S. Attorney’s Office of a potential criminal action.212
Over the next two years, the FBI also erected its own internal wall
that separated intelligence and criminal agents, and in 1997 descrip-
tions of the procedures used to wall-off criminal investigators was in-
cluded in FISA applications, presumably to help OIPR establish that
the “primary purpose” of the requested surveillance would be for in-
telligence-collection purposes.213
The evolving practice led to turf battles and confusion within differ-
ent DOJ components (including the FBI) and between DOJ and the
FISA court.  In the little more than six years between the promulga-
tion of the 1995 procedures and the September 11, 2001, terrorist at-
tacks (which included the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania in 1998 and the USS COLE in 2000), at least three sepa-
rate government reports found fault with how they were imple-
mented.  A 1999 DOJ OIG report found that FBI intelligence agents
“exhibited undue reluctance to disseminate intelligence information”
outside their ranks;214 a team created by the Attorney General re-
ported that “soon after the 1995 Procedures were implemented, OIPR
prevented the FBI from contacting the Criminal Division in contra-
vention of the requirements of the procedures;”215 the General Ac-
counting Office (now the Government Accountability Office)
similarly reported a dearth of contact between the FBI and Criminal
Division because of OIPR’s and FBI’s concerns about FISA applica-
211. Id.
212. DOJ OIG REPORT, supra note 195, at 28–29.
213. See id. at 30–31.
214. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL
REPORT:  THE HANDLING OF FBI INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RELATED TO THE
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE INVESTIGATION § 5(A)(2) (July 1999),
available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9907.htm.
215. DOJ OIG REPORT, supra note 195, at 34 ((referring to The Bellows Report)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Final Report:  Attorney General’s Review Team
on the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation 708, 710 (May
2000), available at http://fas.org/irp/ops/ci/bellows/).
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tions.216  Likewise, beginning in 2000, the FISC also began to impose
restrictions on intelligence sharing in response to a series of errors on
FISA applications that misrepresented the walling-off procedures be-
ing used in several cases.217
It would not be long before these classified deliberations came to
light as smoke from the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, began to
clear, Americans’ shock turned to anger, and they began to seek ac-
countability for that tragedy.  The law enforcement/intelligence wall
became an instant focus of oversight panels.  A joint inquiry by the
congressional intelligence committees found that, by wedging itself
between the law enforcement and intelligence functions of the govern-
ment, the wall lead to “a diminished level of coverage of suspected al-
Qa’ida operatives in the United States.”218  Indeed, a month before
the attacks, an agent in the FBI’s New York Field Office learned that
two of the hijackers were in the United States.219  The DOJ Office of
the Inspector General concluded, simply, that “because of the wall, in
August 2001 when the New York FBI learned that [the two hijackers]
were in the United States, criminal investigators were not allowed to
participate in the search for them.”220
Notwithstanding the later conclusion of the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11
Commission) that even a combined law enforcement and intelligence
search for those hijackers would have required “luck as well as skill”
to find them in time to stop the attacks,221 the political conditions of
the 1970s that led to measures to cabin the intelligence community
had evaporated and within a month and a half of the attacks the wall,
as it had existed, was down.  The October 26, 2001 enactment of the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PA-
TRIOT Act, also known as the Patriot Act), inter alia, amended the
FISA section requiring certification that the purpose of FISA surveil-
lance would be to obtain foreign intelligence information to instead
require only that those ends be “a significant purpose” of the surveil-
216. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FBI INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS:  COOR-
DINATION WITHIN JUSTICE ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CRIMINAL MATTERS IS LIM-
ITED (July 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/232031.pdf.
217. See DOJ OIG REPORT, supra note 195, at 36–38.
218. U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. HOUSE PERMANENT
SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001,
S. Rep. No. 107-351, H.R. Rep. No. 107-792, at xvii (2002) (pagination from unclassi-
fied version of report).
219. NATIONAL COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., 9/11 COMMIS-
SION REPORT 269–72 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
220. DOJ OIG REPORT, supra note 195, at 22.
221. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 219, at 272.
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lance.222  The law also permitted the FISC to authorize roving wire-
taps223 and further included what pejoratively became known as the
“library records” provision, permitting the FBI to seek FISA orders
“requiring the production of any tangible things (including books,
records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to
protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence” and
providing that the individual required to produce such items keep the
request and production confidential.224
Several other major national security initiatives followed in rapid
succession, including the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven-
tion Act of 2004,225 which permitted greater flexibility with regard to
surveillance of persons who may not be acting as an agent of an inter-
national terrorist group, often called “lone wolves;”226 the short-lived
Protect America Act of 2007;227 and the FISA Amendments Act of
2008, which granted broad authority to target for surveillance persons
outside the United States228 and broadened the pool of potential offi-
cials who can certify a FISA application to include the Deputy Direc-
tor of the FBI, if designated by the President as a certifying official
(which President Obama chose to do in Executive Order 13475).229
IV. EVOLVING SOCIAL NORMS AND ACCEPTANCE OF SACRIFICES
TO THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
As the Supreme Court recognized in Quon, “rapid changes in the
dynamics of communication and information transmission are evident
not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper
behavior.”230  Society is currently in the midst of tremendous change
with respect to technology and how these advancements affect our
daily lives.  The increasingly ubiquitous nature of the Internet and the
rise of the sharing economy have resulted in individuals more readily
222. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56
§ 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B),
1823(a)(7)(B)).
223. Id. at § 206 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B)).
224. Id. at § 215 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861).
225. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458,
118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
226. Id. at § 6001 (codified 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B)).
227. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007).  By its own
terms, the Protect America Act was only in effect for six months. See id. at § 6(c).
228. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 Pub.
L. 110-261 at § 101(a)(2), 122 Stat. 2436 (amending Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (FISA) (2008); § 702 (codified at 50 U.S.C § 1881a) (providing
“[p]rocedures for targeting certain persons outside the United States other than
United States persons”).
229. Id. § 104(1)(D)(ii) (for electronic searches); id. § 107(a)(1)(E)(ii) (for physical
searches).
230. City of Ontario, Cal.v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 748 (2010).
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sharing historically private information.231  Total strangers can now
utilize services that would allow them to stay in your home (e.g.,
AirBNB and VRBO), hitch a ride in your car (e.g., Uber and Lyft), or
rent your car completely (e.g., RelayRides and FlightCars).232
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has demonstrated that a key
component of a constitutionally permissible warrantless search or
seizure is whether it violates a reasonable expectation of privacy.  This
standard has become more difficult to apply in modern practice, par-
ticularly in the area of social media and online networks, where public
use and applications have often provided contrary and diametrically
opposed viewpoints of the definition of “reasonable.”  As discussed
below, in the battle between privacy and convenience, the increased
acceptance of permissive storage of personal information with third
parties, and the prevalence of online social media activity, conve-
nience appears to be winning.  With this arguably resulting in a lower
threshold of the privacy one can reasonably expect, it would seem di-
rectly to impact Fourth Amendment analysis.
A. Private/Corporate Surveillance and Data Collection Capabilities
In today’s data-driven environment, every email, social media post,
online purchase, and all web traffic generated by an individual has
value to private companies,233 particularly Internet-based marketers
and advertisers because it allows them to  provide more effective,
nuanced, timely, and targeted ads to users in hopes of generating
sales.234  Analysis of the information may involve a review of intimate
231. See, e.g., Jason Tanz, How Airbnb and Lyft Finally Got Americans to Trust
Each Other, WIRED (Apr. 23, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/trust-in-
the-share-economy/; The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-shar-
ing-economy; TOMIO GERON, Airbnb and  the Unstoppable Rise of the Sharing Econ-
omy, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/
airbnb-and-the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/; Lyndsey Gilpin, We-com-
merce:  The Sharing Economy’s Uncertain Path to Changing the World, TECHREPUB-
LIC, http://www.techrepublic.com/article/we-commerce-the-sharing-economys-uncer
tain-path-to-changing-the-world/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2015).
232. See sources cited supra note 231.
233. Elizabeth Dwoskin, Study:  Digital Marketing Industry Worth $62 Billion,
WALL ST. J., DIGITS BLOG, (Oct. 14, 2013, 4:40 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/
10/14/study-digital-marketing-industry-worth-62-billion/ (describing a report by a
trade group, the Direct Marketing Association, finding that the online marketing in-
dustry was a $62 billion dollar industry).
234. Tanzina Vega, New Ways Marketers Are Manipulating Data to Influence You,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2013, at F2; Joshua Bernstein, Start-Ups Seek to Help Users Put a
Price on Their Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, at B3; Stephanie Clifford,
Your Online Clicks Have Value, for Someone Who Has Something to Sell, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2009, at B9; Cecilia Kang, Google to Put User Photos, Comments in Online
Ads, WASH. POST, (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technol
ogy/google-to-put-user-photos-comments-in-online-ad-endorsements/2013/10/11/322e
483e-3289-11e3-8627-c5d7de0a046b_story.html; Sarah Frier, Facebook To Track
Users Across Devices to Study Shopping Habits, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 13, 2014, 12:00
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information about an individual, leading to growing concern about the
privacy interests of such activity.235
For instance, most commercial websites today include a link to the
company’s privacy policy on its homepage, which provides the site’s
users and visitors with a description of the type of information that the
website collects,236 likely to include the user’s Internet Protocol ad-
dress, the type of web browser used to access the website, and the
specific pages on that website which a user visits.237  The policies also
offer a general description of what companies do with this information
once collected, including, for example, how the company anticipates
using such collected data internally and how such information may be
shared with other parties.238
As people have become more cognizant of and sensitive to the use
of their online data, they have tended to react adversely when they
think a company’s privacy policy exceeds acceptable norms.  In 2013,
Facebook was forced to delay the implementation and roll out of its
revised privacy policy after public comments239 raised concerns that
the new policy did not adequately protect user’s personal informa-
tion.240  Similar disapproval has been expressed regarding Google,241
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-13/facebook-to-track-users-
across-devices-to-study-shopping-habits.
235. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 234; Mike Swift, Battle Brewing Over Control
of Personal Data Online, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 28, 2011, at A2, available at
http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_18349132 (June 26, 2011); Cecilia Kang, Google
Tracks Consumers’ Online Activities Across Products and Users Can’t Opt Out,
WASH. POST, (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/
google-tracks-consumers-across-products-users-cant-opt-out/2012/01/24/gIQArgJHO
Q_story.html.
236. See, e.g., Google Privacy Policy, available at https://www.google.com/intl/en/
policies/privacy/?fg=1 (last modified Dec. 19, 2014).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., Comments from Facebook Users, Proposed Updates to Our Gov-
erning Documents, FACEBOOK, (Aug. 29, 2013, 9:22 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/
20131119201649/https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-site-governance/proposed
-updates-to-our-governing-documents/10153167395945301 (accessed through web-
archive); Letter from Marc Rotenberg, Exec. Dir., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr.et al. to
Edith Ramirez et al., the Fed. Trade Comm’n (Sept. 4, 2013) (regarding Facebook’s
Changes Regarding Sponsored Stories), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/
packages/pdf/technology/privacy-groups-letter-ftc.pdf; Drew Guarini, Hold Your
Gasps, Facebook Is Under Fire For Its Privacy Policy Again, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 5, 2013, 1:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/05/facebook-privacy-
ftc_n_3873764.html.
240. See, e.g., Vindu Goel & Edward Wyatt, Facebook Privacy Change Is Subject to
F.T.C. Inquiry, NY TIMES (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/tech
nology/personaltech/ftc-looking-into-facebook-privacy-policy.html (Sept. 11, 2013)
(relaying the comments of Senator Edward Markey, D-MA:  “This troubling shift in
policy raises a number of questions about whether Facebook is improperly altering its
privacy policy without proper user consent and, if the changes go into effect, the de-
gree to which Facebook users will lose control over their personal information”);
Facebook Delays Controversial Privacy Policy Change, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 6,
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Fitbit,242 and AT&T’s243 privacy policies, and critics question whether
such policies contain sufficient safeguards for protecting sensitive user
information.
Public awareness of companies’ use of their personal information
and website activities also has opened the door to new privacy con-
cerns.  Web browsers now include options to help users limit informa-
tion sharing about their website visits and history on a particular
computer, along with other potentially identifying information that
the software may otherwise retain.244  Additionally, such software
often includes options to block or limit the use of digital “cookies,”245
which websites use to passively track users’ activities.246
2013, 11:49 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/06/facebook-privacy-policy-
change_n_3880288.html.
241. Google has been subject of significant investigations by European regulators
over the company’s user privacy responsibilities. See e.g., Sam Schechner, EU Privacy
Watchdogs Warn Google About Its Policy, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2014, 1:27 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-privacy-watchdogs-warn-google-about-its-policy-1411
666047; Danny Hakim, Google Is Target of European Backlash on U.S. Tech Domi-
nance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/technology/
google-is-target-of-european-backlash-on-us-tech-dominance.html; Charles Arthur,
Google Facing Legal Threats from Six European Countries Over Privacy, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 2, 2013, 12:53 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/apr/02/google-
privacy-policy-legal-threat-europe.  The company was alleged to have violated privacy
rules in a number of countries including France and Spain.  Arthur, supra.
242. Laura Ryan, Fitbit Hires Lobbyists After Privacy Controversy, NAT’L J. (Sept.
15, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/fitbit-hires-lobbyists-after-privacy-
controversy-20140915.
243. Drew Guarini, AT&T Is Going To Start Selling Your Data; So Here’s How
You Can Opt Out, HUFFINGTON POST (July 8, 2013, 12:05 PM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/2013/07/08/att-selling-data_n_3561263.html.
244. The feature has become ubiquitous among many popular web browsers, with
each developer including information about how to utilize the functionality in the
product descriptions. See, e.g., Browse in private (incognito mode), GOOGLE, https://
support.google.com/chrome/answer/95464?hl=en (last visited Jan. 12, 2015); Private
Browsing - Browse the Web Without Saving Information About the Sites You Visit,
MOZILLA, available at https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/private-browsing-browse-
web-without-saving-info (last visited Jan. 12, 2015); What is In Private Browsing?,
MICROSOFT, available at http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/what-is-inpri-
vate-browsing#1TC=windows-7 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
245. See, e.g., How to Block Tracking Cookies, WASH. POST (July 17, 2005), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/16/AR2005071600111.html
(describing how many of the common internet web browsing software contain options
to stop tracking cookies).
246. See Adam Tanner, The Web Cookie is Dying.  Here’s the Creepier Technology
That Comes Next, FORBES (June 17, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
adamtanner/2013/06/17/the-web-cookie-is-dying-heres-the-creepier-technology-that-
comes-next/.  As Tanner’s article explains, in an effort to circumvent software block-
ing tracking cookies, internet advertisers have developed a practice known as “finger-
printing” which “allows a web site to look at the characteristics of a computer such as
what plugins and software you have installed, the size of the screen, the time zone,
fonts and other features of any particular machine . . . [which collectively] form a
unique signature just like random skin patterns on a finger.” Id.; see also Olga Kharif,
The Cookies You Can’t Crumble, BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.busi-
nessweek.com/articles/2014-08-21/facebook-google-go-beyond-cookies-to-reap-data-
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Notwithstanding the primary goal of targeted advertising, compa-
nies have also been criticized for their data collection activities and for
how they utilize this data in other contexts.  For instance, in 2012, Tar-
get was lambasted in the media over reports that its internal data ana-
lytics resulted in sending a teen girl coupons for baby-related items
before the girl had disclosed that she was pregnant.247  Facebook Data
Science, a research service that analyzes data trends of Facebook
users, released the results of its study showing that it was able to esti-
mate with fairly good accuracy based on user’s activity on the social
networking site when a relationship begins and ends.248  The company
has also been criticized for its “Facedeals” camera, which uses facial
recognition technology to identify people to provide offers and special
deals.249  Similarly, Google has built a function into Google Maps that
offers users specials and discounts at points of interest that are ex-
plored in the map.250
The mining of data is not limited to web traffic but also extends to
email.  For instance, in addition to keeping track of people’s search
histories,251 Google also indexes both the text of emails and the con-
tents of all attachments.252  Although doing so may have beneficial
and helpful aspects, including the ability to inform users when they
for-advertisers.  For a summary of all the ways that Facebook tracks its users across
the internet, see Byron Acohido, Facebook Tracking Is Under Scrutiny, USA TODAY
(Nov. 16, 2011, 9:03 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2011-11-15/
facebook-privacy-tracking-data/51225112/1.
247. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, NY TIMES MAGAZINE
(Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html;
Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl  Was Pregnant Before Her Father
Did, FORBES (Feb. 16 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/
02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/.
248. Kate Rogers, Facebook Knows When You’re off the Market Before You Do,
FOX BUSINESS (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/02/
18/facebook-knows-when-youre-off-market-before-do/  [hereinafter Rogers, Face-
book Knows].
249. Mark Prigg, The Facebook Camera That Can Recognize You Every Time You
Walk into a Shop, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
sciencetech/article-2187801/were-watching-The-camera-recognise-Facebook-picture-
time-walk-shop.html.
250. Google Maps Update Offers Indoor Walking Directions, FOX NEWS (May 11,
2012), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/05/11/google-maps-update-offers-indoor-
walking-directions/.
251. See, e.g., Zack Christenson, Google’s Data-Collecting Habits Draw More Scru-
tiny, THE HILL (Oct. 29, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/
technology/264685-googles-data-collecting-habits-drawing-more-scrutiny.
252. See e.g., Google Accused of Spying on Gmail Users, RT (Oct. 12, 2012, 3:46
PM), http://rt.com/usa/news/google-gmail-users-plaintiffs-289/.  In fact, recent pres-
sure from student groups and privacy advocates resulted in Google agreeing to not
data mine email accounts under its Google Apps for Education services. See e.g.,
Alastair Barr, Google Stops Scanning Student Gmail Accounts for Ads, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 30, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/04/30/google-stops-scanning-student-
gmail-accounts-for-ads/; Laura Northup, Google Will Strop Data-Mining Student E-
Mail Accounts, CONSUMERIST (Apr. 30, 2014), http://consumerist.com/2014/04/30/
google-will-stop-data-mining-student-e-mail-accounts/.
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have bills to pay, many are concerned about the privacy interests im-
plicated by the company actively keeping tabs on users’ financial de-
tails.253  While the outward impression is that Google is primarily a
search engine or email provider, the core of the company’s business is
advertising and marketing.254  Allowing the company to search and
index one’s private emails thus becomes the true cost of the free email
that Gmail users enjoy.255
Apprehension surrounding the collection of personal data has not
been limited to online activities; it also increasingly extends to
smartphones capable of storing and providing large amounts of per-
sonal information and user activities256 and the increased prevalence
of global positioning devices and activity trackers.257  Activity trackers
such as those sold by FitBit, Garmin, Adidas, and Jawbone, among
others, commonly provide users with pertinent information about
their daily activities such as the number of steps that they have taken
throughout the day, distance traveled, and calories burned.258  More
253. Alistair Barr, Google Can Read Your Emailed Bills and Remind You to Pay
Up, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/10/07/google-can-read-
your-emailed-bills-and-remind-you-to-pay-up/.
254. See, e.g., Google Inc. Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2014 Results,
GOOGLE (Jan. 29, 2015), http://investor.google.com/earnings/2014/Q4_google_earn
ings.html (reporting that the company’s websites generated nearly $12.43 billion dol-
lars or 69% of the revenues for the Fourth Quarter of 2014).
255. This model (giving up privacy in exchange for a service) has been utilized by a
number of different software applications. See, e.g., Kim Komando, Free Apps Collect
Your Personal Data, FOX NEWS (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2014/11/
08/free-apps-collect-your-personal-data/ (finding that research at Carnegie Mellon
University uncovered that many apps often seek access to user’s personal information
on their phones, even if such information is unrelated to the functionality of the app);
Rogers, Facebook Knows, supra note 248 (noting the comments of social media re-
porter Jon Constantine who notes that “People talk a lot about [how] they care about
privacy, but we ultimately won’t give up services over it”).
256. David Goldman, Carrier IQ:  Your Phone’s Secret Recording Device, CNN
MONEY (Dec. 1, 2011, 6:28 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/12/01/technology/car-
rier_iq/index.htm; Gerry Smith, Carrier IQ:  Researcher Trevor Eckhart Outs Creepy,
Hidden App Installed On Smartphones, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 30, 2011, 12:11 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/30/carrier-iq-trevor-eckhart_n_1120727.html;
John R. Quain, Carrier IQ Not Alone:  Most Smartphones Will Track You, FOX NEWS
(Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/12/06/in-tracking-companies-re-
veal-their-low-iq/; Shaun Waterman, New Software Uses Smartphone Camera for Spy-
ing, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/oct/2/
new-software-uses-smartphone-camera-spying/ (describing software that can hijack
users cell phones to combine images and GPS to create 3D maps of indoor spaces).
257. Mark Saltzman, GPS Navigation Units More Popular as Prices Fall, USA TO-
DAY (May 13, 2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/products/services/2009-05-
12-popular-gps-navigation-units_N.htm (noting that nearly 17 million GPS unites
were sold in 2009); Don Reisinger, After 23 Years Garmin Reaches 100 Million De-
vices Sold, CNET (May 2, 2012), http://www.cnet.com/news/after-23-years-garmin-
reaches-100-million-devices-sold/ (noting robust sales by GPS manufacturer Garmin,
including 75 million units sold between 2007–2012).
258. Matthew Miller, Data Accessibility is Key to Successful Activity Tracking Sys-
tem, ZDNET (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/article/data-accessibility-is-key-to-
a-successful-activity-tracking-system/; Christian Payne, How Activity Trackers Re-
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advanced models offer users the ability to track their heart rate, their
sleep patterns, and even the user’s location.259  While these activity
trackers were intended to help users track and reach their fitness
goals, the data captured is also of significant interest to the companies
manufacturing the devices,260 as well as third-parties offering related
services or data analysis.261  A number of insurance companies, for
example, have offered members discounts on their health insurance
premiums if data provided by activity trackers reflect the user having
reached certain activity milestones.262
Notwithstanding the potential that personal health information
could be used, parsed out, and sold, the market for those activity
trackers has exploded over the last few years.263  New models with
varying price points and features have been introduced frequently,
move Our Rights to Our Most Intimate Data, THE GUARDIAN (June 3, 2014), http://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/03/how-activity-trackers-remove-rights-
personal-data; Carol Mangis, Are Activity Trackers a Privacy Nightmare?, CONSUMER
REPORTS (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/08/are-ac
tivity-trackers-a-privacy-nightmare/index.html.
259. See generally id.  See also Kelly Santos, Can Fitness Trackers Threaten Your
Privacy?, CREDIT (Aug. 19, 2014), http://blog.credit.com/2014/08/can-exercise-apps-
threaten-your-privay-93316/.
260. See, e.g., Leo Hickman, G2:  Dear Digital Diary. . .:  From Sleeping and Eating
to Exercise and Travel, Technology Now Allows Us to Track and Analyse Every Detail
of our Lives.  But, asks Leo Hickman, How Can it Help Us Actually Improve Them?,
THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Aug, 13, 2012, at 10 (noting concerns that “the default
setting is that this data is shared.  This is wrong.  Users are asked to sync with
Facebook.  People who use these apps are thinking about their health, not about data
privacy.  But all this data is very valuable.  More often than not, you don’t even get to
own the data you are generating.  Most of it is stored on client-side data servers.  This
is turning into a huge business.  Companies are circling at the moment.”); see also
Bryan Walsh, Data Mine:  The Next Revolution in Personal Health May Be the Little
Step-Tracking Band on Your Wrist, TIME, Nov. 24, 2014, at 35 (relaying the comments
of Andrew Rosenthal, the group manager for wellness and platform at Jawbone (a
manufacturer of activity trackers) who noted that parsing out the data gathered by
such devices could allow for companies to “help steer people toward the health solu-
tions that work best for them”) [hereinafter Walsh, Data Mine].
261. For instance, some personal trainers are able to monitor the activities of its
clients based on the data generated by the trackers, in part, to be able to offer addi-
tional guidance and services.  Courtney Rubin, Your Trainer Saw That, NY TIMES,
Apr. 17, 2014, at E7.
262. See, e.g., Walsh, Data Mine, supra note 260, at 35 (noting how employees of
the Cleveland Clinic are eligible for lowered health insurance premiums in exchange
for using an activity tracker); Kate Knibbs, An Insurance Company Will Pay You to
Use Your Fitness Tracker, GIZMODO (Dec. 9, 2014), http://gizmodo.com/an-insurance-
company-will-pay-you-to-use-your-fitness-t-1668967153 (describing the program of-
fered by NY based insurance company Oscar); see also Issie Lapowsky, This Insur-
ance Company Pays People to Stay Fit, WIRED (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.wired.com/
2014/12/oscar-misfit/ (noting that the co-founder of Oscar has admitted that one of
the driving forces behind providing fitness trackers to its members “is to collect more
health data on its members to make sure doctors have the most information available
on them”).
263. See Walsh, Data Mine, supra note 260, at 35 (relaying the estimates of research
showing that 42 million wearable activity trackers were shipped in 2014, compared
with 32 million the prior year, an increase of over 31%).
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with people seemingly weighing in favor of the functionality provided
by such devices as a seemingly acceptable tradeoff for the potential
intrusion on their privacy.264
B. Known Vulnerabilities of Electronic Communications
and Stored Data
In part because of how valuable information has become, its secur-
ity is constantly under threat.265  Companies and governments have
invested untold millions of dollars to upgrade their computer net-
works and data security protocols, both to thwart attacks by computer
hackers and to assure their users that they can be trusted to hold
users’ personal information.  No matter how much money has been
invested in this area, however, nothing is truly foolproof.266  Unfortu-
nately, almost every segment of the population has been or could be
affected by data breaches,267 which has led to quantifiable losses (e.g.,
264. Brier Dudley, Fitness Gadgets Raise Privacy Concerns Under New Health In-
surance Rules, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 9, 2014), http://seattletimes.com/html/business-
technology/2022868569_briercolumn10xml.html; Walsh, Data Mine, supra note 260
(noting that internet security company Symantec reported that such activity trackers
were vulnerable to potential data breaches).
265. David Barton, When Will Your Data Breach Happen? Not a Question of If But
When, SECURITY INFO WATCH (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.securityinfowatch.com/ar
ticle/12052877/preparing-for-your-companys-inevitable-data-breach; Ingrid Lunden,
Business Services, Retail Saw the Most Online Security Breaches in 2014:  FireEye,
TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 24, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/24/fireeye-security-
breaches-2014/; Laura Rosbrow, Israeli Startup enSilo Raises Est, $2–3 Million Seed
Round to Prevent Attacks, GEEKTIME (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.geektime.com/2015/
03/10/israeli-cyber-startup-ensilo-raises-est-2-3-million-seed-round-to-prevent-attacks.
266. Nicole Perlroth & David Gelles, Russian Hackers Amass Over a Billion In-
ternet Passwords, NY TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/tech
nology/russian-gang-said-to-amass-more-than-a-billion-stolen-internet-credentials
.html (noting the view of “some in the security community that keeping personal in-
formation out of the hands of thieves is increasingly a losing battle”).
267. See, e.g., John Roberts, Exclusive:  Drones vulnerable to Terrorist Hijacking,
Researchers Say, FOX NEWS (June 25, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/06/25/
drones-vulnerable-to-terrorist-hijacking-researchers-say/ (relaying that GPS receiver
in drones could be surreptitiously taken over by hackers); John D. Sutter, Facebook
pulls location tracking feature, CNN (June 26, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/26/
tech/social-media/facebook-pulls-find-friends-nearby/index.html (noting that after
user complaints, Facebook retracted a feature that would allow users to see the loca-
tion of nearby friends); Facebook Flaw Means Anyone Can See Private Photos, FOX
NEWS (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2011/12/06/facebook-flaw-means-
anyone-can-see-your-photos/ (noting that a flaw in the website would allow even pho-
tographs marked as private by individuals to be viewed publicly; since the news re-
port, Facebook has addressed and closed the flaw); Eric Yoder, TSP Discloses
Hacking of Accounts, WASH. POST (May 25, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/federal-eye/post/tsp-discloses-hacking-of-accounts/2012/05/25/gJQAsM4kpU_
blog.html (disclosing that the federal Thrift Savings Plan was the target of a “sophisti-
cated cyber attack”, whereby social security numbers from the affected accounts were
taken); David Goldman, More Than 6 Million LinkedIn Passwords Stolen, CNN
MONEY, (June 7, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/06/technology/linkedin-pass
word-hack/index.htm (reporting on the breach of passwords to user LinkedIn ac-
counts); James Rogers, Expert:  Dropbox Leak Highlights Password Security Dangers,
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financial, identity theft, stolen passwords, and credit card numbers), as
well as unquantifiable ones (e.g., invasion of privacy and embarrass-
ment over the information made public).
For instance, recent reports by the New York Times noted that a
Russian crime ring had collected nearly 1.2 billion usernames and
passwords to various websites, as well as 500 million email ad-
dresses.268  Computer security experts noted that this information has
been used by the thieves for advertisement purposes but that its real
value is its potential to be used for identity theft.269  Less than a
month later, it was reported that hackers breached JPMorgan Chase
& Co., taking gigabytes of sensitive financial information.270  News re-
ports relaying instances of online data breaches have seemingly be-
come de rigueur, as companies of all sizes and industries have become
the victim of online thieves for financial information.271  One cyber
FOX NEWS (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2014/10/14/expert-dropbox-
leak-highlights-password-security-perils/ (noting that login credentials for hundreds of
users of cloud storage service Dropbox were compromised); Charles Arthur, Cyber-
Attack Concerns Raised Over Boeing 787 Chip’s ‘Back Door’, THE GUARDIAN (May
29, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/may/29/cyber-attack-con-
cerns-boeing-chip (discussing how two researchers believe that the computer chip in
the Boeing 787 and other military aircraft could be taken over through the internet,
via a back door flaw in the design of the chip); State Department Shuts Down Email
System After Suspected Hacker Attack, FOX NEWS (Nov. 16, 2014), http://www
.foxnews.com/politics/2014/11/16/state-department-shuts-down-email-system-after-
suspected-hacker-attack/ (reporting that the U.S. State Department shut down its en-
tire unclassified email system after security experts detected a suspected data breach);
Ed Pilkington, Playstation and Xbox Facing Issues After Christmas Day Attack, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 25, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/25/play
station-xbox-down-lizard-squad-hack-christmas (describing a denial of service attack
on the Playstation and Xbox online gaming communities which resulted in both ser-
vices being taken offline).
268. See Perlroth & Gelles, supra note 266.
269. Id.  As Perlroth and Gelles relay, because many people use similar login cre-
dentials on various websites, the information collected by the Russian crime ring may
potentially be used to try to access any number of financial institutions. Id.
270. Michael Riley & Jordan Robertson, FBI Said to Examine Whether Russia Tied
to JPMorgan Hacking, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-08-27/fbi-said-to-be-probing-whether-russia-tied-to-jpmorgan-
hacking.
271. See, e.g., Rachel Abrams, Target Puts Data Breach Costs at $148 Million, and
Forecasts Profit Drop, NY TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/
business/target-puts-data-breach-costs-at-148-million.html (noting that personal data
and credit card information was stolen for nearly 12 million of Target store’s guests);
Amitra Jayakumar, Michaels Says 3 Million Customers Hit by Data Breach, WASH.
POST (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/michaels-
says-nearly-3-million-customers-hit-by-data-breach/2014/04/18/3074e432-c6fc-11e3-
8b9a-8e0977a24aeb_story.html (noting that nearly 3 million customers of craft stores,
Michaels and Aaron Brothers, had their credit or debit card accounts taken); Michael
Calia, P.F. Chang’s Says Data Breach Affected 33 Locations, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4,
2014) http://www.wsj.com/articles/p-f-changs-says-data-breach-affected-33-locations-
1407159131 (noting that for a nearly eight month period, customers at 33 of the res-
taurant chain’s locations may have had credit card numbers, names and expiration
dates stolen); Maggie McGrath, Home Depot Confirms Data Breach, Investigating
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security expert has noted that such occurrences will likely remain
commonplace in the foreseeable future.272
Even when financial information is not directly taken by thieves
and hackers, the damage to victims can be substantial.  In November
2014, Sony Entertainment suffered a massive data breach.273  Included
in the trove of information taken were employees’ social security
numbers, medical records, confidential internal communications, and
even five previously unreleased movies.  The leaked information in-
cluded embarrassing comments made by the company’s leadership
about other Hollywood individuals, harming the company’s reputa-
tion.274  The leak also resulted in the early release of the movie The
Interview to online streaming services that do not provide for the same
level of revenue generation as traditional movie theaters.275
Transactions From April Onward, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/maggiemcgrath/2014/09/08/home-depot-confirms-data-breach-investigating-trans
actions-from-april-onward/; Jimmy John’s Reveals Breach of Credit, Debit Data, CHI.
TRIB. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/breaking/chi-jimmy-
johns-data-breach-20140924-story.html.
272. Jay Johnson, If 2014 Was The Year Of the Data Breach, Brace For More,
FORBES (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/01/02/if-2014-
was-the-year-of-the-data-breach-brace-for-more/.
273. See generally Gregg Kilday & Tatiana Siegel, Sony Hack:  Studio Security
Points to Inside Job, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.hollywood-
reporter.com/news/sony-hack-studio-security-points-753509; Shannon Pettypiece,
Sony Hack Reveals Health Details on Employees, Children, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11,
2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-11/sony-hack-reveals-health-details-
on-employees- and-their-children.html; Andrew Wallenstein, Sony’s New Movies
Leak Online Following Hack Attack, VARIETY (Nov. 29, 2014), http://variety.com/
2014/digital/news/new-sony-films-pirated-in-wake-of-hack-attack-1201367036/; Ben
Fritz & Danny Yadron, Sony Hack Exposed Personal Data of Hollywood Stars, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sony-pictures-hack-reveals-more-
data-than-previously-believed-1417734425; Sam Frizell, Report:  Sony’s Security Team
Was Unprepared for Hack, TIME (Dec. 5, 2014), http://time.com/3620288/sony-hack-
unprepared/.
274. Todd Cunningham & Sharon Waxman, Sony Struggles to Fight #GOP Hackers
Who Claim Stolen Data Includes Stars’ IDs, Budget and Contract Figures, THE WRAP
(Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.thewrap.com/sony-execs-working-on-chalkboards-while-
hackers-claim-stolen-data-includes-stars-ids-budget-and-contract-figures/; Philip
Caulfield & Corky Siemaszko, Sony Email Hack Shows Scott Rudin, Amy Pascal
Making Racist Jokes about Obama; Producer Apologies, NY DAILY NEWS (Dec. 11,
2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/rudin-pascal-made-racist-
jokes-obama-sony-hacks-article-1.2041618; Charlie Campbell, Sony Pictures Chief
Amy Pascal Joked About Obama’s Race, TIME (Dec. 11, 2014), http://time.com/
3629480/sony-pictures-hack-amy-pascal-emails/; Terence McCoy, Sony’s Amy Pascal’s
future in Hollywood in Doubt Following Disastrous E-mail Hack, WASH. POST (Dec.
12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/12/12/sonys-
amy-pascals-future-in-hollywood-in-doubt-following-disastrous-e-mail-hack/.
275. David Carr, How the Hacking at Sony Over ‘The Interview’ Became a Horror
Movie, NY TIMES (Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/22/business/media
/hacking-at-sony-over-the-interview-reveals-hollywoods-failings-too.html; Bernard
Condon, Sony Hacking Fallout Explodes As Theaters Cancel ‘The Interview’ Show-
ings, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/17/
sony-hack-theaters_n_6338246.html; Melissa Locker, Did North Korea Hack Sony
Pictures Over The Interview?, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 29, 2014), http://www.vanityfair
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Embarrassment and invasion of individual privacy were also at the
center of two similar data breaches involving the public dissemination
of intimate user photographs by hackers.  In October 2014, hackers
were able to access Apple’s iCloud data backup systems containing
photographs taken by owners of iPhones.276  Many of the images
taken were private, intimate photographs of celebrities, which were
subsequently cataloged and released on public online message
boards.277  Similarly, hackers breached security for the app Snapchat
despite the company’s claims that the disappearing nature of the com-
munications passed through the site was a main security feature.278
Private and intimate images that users mistakenly believed would be
deleted from existence seconds after they had been viewed were
found posted online.279  Hackers were able to exploit a security flaw in
.com/hollywood/2014/11/north-korea-james-franco-seth-rogen.  It has been alleged
that the data breach was the result of North Korean computer hackers, who had
sought to retaliate against Sony for producing the film. See generally id.  The movie
centers around a fictional plot to assassinate the leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un.
Id.
276. Mark Rogowsky, Yes, Celebs Had Their iCloud Accounts Hacked.  No, You
Shouldn’t Shut Yours Off, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2104), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mark
rogowsky/2014/09/03/the-celeb-hack-has-people-telling-you-to-turn-off-cloud-backup-
ignore-them/; Alan Duke, 5 Things to Know About the Celebrity Nude Photo Hacking
Scandal, CNN (Oct. 12, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/02/showbiz/hacked-nude-
photos-five-things/; Brian X. Chen, Apple Says It Will Add New iCloud Security Mea-
sures After Celebrity Hack, NY TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/
2014/09/04/apple-says-it-will-add-new-security-measures-after-celebrity-hack/; Mike
Isaac, Nude Photos of Jennifer Lawrence Are Latest Front in Online Privacy Debate,
NY TIMES (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/technology/trove-of-
nude-photos-sparks-debate-over-online-behavior.html.
277. Stuart Oldham, Jennifer Lawrence, Kate Upton, Ariana Grande Among Celeb-
rities Exposed in Massive Nude Photo Leak, VARIETY (Aug. 31, 2014), http://variety
.com/2014/biz/news/jennifer-lawrence-kate-upton-ariana-grande-exposed-in-massive-
nude-photo-leak-1201295180/.
278. See, e.g., Alyssa Newcomb, Snapchat Settles with FTC Over Claims It Deceived
Users About Disappearing Messages, ABC NEWS (May 8, 2014), http://abcnews.go
.com/Technology/snapchat-settles-federal-trade-commission-claims-deceived-users/
story?id=23642852 (May 8, 2014); Christina Warren, Ghost in the Shell, The Snapchat
Privacy Illusion, MASHABLE (Oct. 13, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/10/13/snap
chat-inherently-insecure/ (noting the “inherent security flow within Snapchat’s prod-
uct. . . [is] the promise of disappearing images is really just an illusion”).  Snapchat
was recently the target of a Federal Trade Commission investigation over deceptive
claims that the touted ethereal nature of messages passed through the service was not
accurate. Snapchat ‘Deceived Users’ About Disappearing Messages, Will be Monitored
by Gov’t, RT (May 9, 2014), http://rt.com/usa/157960-snapchat-deceived-users/.  Ulti-
mately Snapchat settled with the government over the false promises that messages
would disappear, as well as over misleading statements made about the amount of
personal data it collected and security features.  See Snapchat Settles FTC Charges
That Promises of Disappearing Messages Were False, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(May 8, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-set
tles-ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were.
279. Brian Fung, A Snapchat Security Breach Affects 4.6 Million Users.  Did
Snapchat Drag Its Feet on a Fix?, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/01/a-snapchat-security-breach-affects-4-
6-million-users-did-snapchat-drag-its-feet-on-a-fix/; James Rogers, Leaked Snapchat
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a third-party application that worked with the Snapchat service and
were able to copy and publicly leak Snapchat users’ images, despite
bypassing the Snapchat’s own servers.280
With potentially billions of dollars, credit card numbers, and pass-
words and innumerable emails, documents, and pictures at stake, the
solution remains unclear.  Technical means such as firewalls, encryp-
tion, and access protocols are only as effective as the expertise of the
programmer and engineer.  As the data breaches of 2014 illustrate,
loopholes and flaws can render even the most robust security methods
ineffective in the hands of motivated and skilled hackers.281
Websites have attempted to add a user element to enhance security
and ensure that only the account holder can access particular re-
sources.  This has often involved including asking extra questions of a
personal nature, in addition to the usual username and password.  For
example, some websites require users to provide answers to personal
questions when creating accounts (mother’s maiden name, first
school, name of first pet, model of first car, name of the street you
grew up on, etc.), which are referenced when users are unable to re-
member their login information or sometimes to confirm a user’s
identity when logging into the site.282
In a vacuum and as isolated measures, these security features can be
very effective, but in the aggregate, they mean that users are forced to
reveal yet more personal information about themselves.  Further,
websites’ protocols that disallow repetition of old passwords indicates
Images Should Serve as a Wake-Up Call to Users, Expert Says, FOX NEWS (Oct. 13,
2014), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2014/10/13/expert-leaked-snapchat-images-
should-serve-as-wake-up-call-to-users (noting that nearly 200,000 images, including
possibly child pornography, were released as a result of the Snapchat breach);
Snapchat Blames Other Apps for Breach, TIME (Oct. 10, 2014), http://fortune.com/
2014/10/10/snapchat-blames-other-apps-for-breach/.
280. See generally Alyssa Newcomb, How Hackers Got Private Photos Without
Ever Breaching Snapchat’s Servers, ABC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2014), http://abcnews.go
.com/Technology/hackers-private-photos-breaching-snapchats-servers/
story?id=26156997.
281. Rogowsky, supra note 276.  As Rogowsky explains, the cause of the breach to
the Apple iCloud service in the celebrity nude photo scandal was due to a flaw that
“Apple left a big hole in iCloud that allowed hackers to try an unlimited number of
guesses at passwords without being locked out (since fixed).” Id.
282. See, e.g., Melinda Beck, Health Website Security Questions Leave Some Flum-
moxed, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230
4384104579145933319187114; Kristen J. Mathews, Security Questions:  What is Your
Pet’s Name?, PROSKAUER ROSE, http://www.proskauer.com/files/Media/dccb2c51-
ffa7-4a26-b99d-0773fa10c782/Presentation/TranscriptFile/Security%20Questions_
What%20is%20your%20pets%20name.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2015); Joe Kissell,
When password security questions aren’t secure, MACWORLD (Nov. 29, 2012), http://
www.macworld.com/article/2016925/when-password-security-questions-arent-secure
.html; SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE:  CREATING STRONG PASSWORDS, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (2015), available at https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/creating-
strong-passwords; Jessica Griggs, ‘Secret’ Questions Leave Accounts Vulnerable, NEW
SCIENTIST (June 22, 2009), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn17347-secret-ques-
tions-leave-accounts-vulnerable.html.
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that the sites are storing those old passwords.  Even if the system ad-
ministrators can be assumed to be trustworthy in all instances, these
practices incentivize hacking of seemingly innocuous systems likely to
be soft targets283 not for the substantive information, but for the an-
swers to the questions and password patterns remembered by the sys-
tems.  As the Russian hacking incident illustrates, sometimes
information and systems can be accessed and gleaned through brute
force and repeated attempts with compromised information from an-
other website.  The end result is a cascading effect whereby the infor-
mation acquired from a website storing significant personal
information about a user might then be used to access subsequent
websites using the same or similar information.  In this way, users
(and, ironically, their compliance with security policies) enable and
facilitate the equivalent of electronic dumpster diving.284
C. Behavioral Factors
Despite the knowledge that more and more private and personal
information is being collected by companies and that these companies
are often helpless against rising threats to data security, people are
increasingly entrusting their information to these outside entities.
As noted by social media reporter Jon Constantine, at the core of
this quandary is that “[p]eople talk a lot about [that] they care about
privacy, but we ultimately won’t give up services over it.”285  Despite
great interest and significant debate about the right balance, it is ap-
parent that for users, convenience and services have won out.  The
dangers and warnings offered by experts in data security have not dis-
suaded the general public from putting their private information at
risk.  This behavior is relevant here for two reasons:  (1) the lip service
paid to the importance of privacy when convenience is a demonstrably
more influential factor; and (2) the unprompted sharing of informa-
tion, most commonly via social media networks, that has led to a blur-
283. The network effect that allows soft targets to be gateways to harder ones is
also why, for example, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screening stan-
dards are the same for small rural airports as they are for large urban ones that might
be more attractive to potential attackers.  The weakest spots of any network are the
ones most likely to be exploited.
284. For a fantastic discussion of the vulnerability paradox of redundant security
measures, see Scott D. Sagan, The Problem of Redundancy Problem:  Why More Nu-
clear Security Forces May Lead to Less Nuclear Security, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 934
(2004), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20274/redundancy_risk_analysis.pdf
(discussing examples where additional redundant systems meant as failsafes can in-
crease the possible points of failure).
285. Rogers, Facebook Knows, supra note 248. But c.f. Steve Lohr, The Privacy
Paradox, a Challenge for Business, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2012), http://bits.blogs.ny
times.com/2014/06/12/the-privacy-paradox-a-challenge-for-business/ (discussing how a
recent study indicated that “People around the world are thrilled by the ease and
convenience of their smartphones and Internet services, but they aren’t willing to
trade their privacy to get more of it”).
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ring of the previously established lines between public and private
spheres.
With respect to the first, individuals’ desires to access services, con-
veniences, and benefits often outweighs any corresponding privacy
concerns, as demonstrated by consumer trends.  As discussed previ-
ously, users willingly use email services, smartphone apps, activity
trackers, and GPS devices even though each service—and even more
so collectively—collects information about the user that he may not
otherwise feel comfortable disclosing publicly.  The use of these ser-
vices, therefore, provide the implied and tacit consent for companies
to passively track these individuals.286  Users enjoy the benefits of
having connected smart devices, which use the Internet to remotely
operate light bulbs, appliances, and home security systems, even
though doing so results in making vulnerable the user’s entire home
network.287  The ability to map a workout and jog has taken a priority
over concerns that one’s route can also be viewed in real time to track
the user’s location with precision.288  Users do all this while being on
notice that online communications and transactions are remarkably
vulnerable.
Secondly, the decline of privacy can also be illustrated by the rise of
popularity in social media networks and similar applications.  Web-
sites and apps such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat al-
low users to post unprompted and private information about their
thoughts, activities, and whereabouts.  Behaviors such as sexting and
bragging about criminal activity have become common fodder on so-
cial media, notwithstanding the ease at which salacious material can
“go viral.”  As one researcher has argued, the motivations behind such
postings may stem from narcissistic impulses and users’ desires to em-
phasize qualities they believe are important to their public persona.289
Alternatively, their activities illustrate a perhaps mistaken trust in the
286. Consider also something as seemingly innocuous as a grocery store loyalty
card.  While grocery stores often tout the card as a means for shoppers to access sale
prices and specials, the card also links shoppers’ purchases to a database that compiles
buying histories and other trends.  This information can then be sold to marketers, or
used internally for targeted advertisement, as was the case of Target’s algorithm cor-
relating purchase patterns with likely pregnancy. See text accompanying note 247,
supra.
287. See Kim Zetter, How Thieves Can Hack and Disable Your Home Alarm Sys-
tem, WIRED (July 23, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/07/hacking-home-alarms/;
Kashmir Hill, How Your Security System Could Be Hacked To Spy On You, FORBES
(July 23, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/23/how-your-security-
system-could-be-used-to-spy-on-you/.
288. Applications include Greenalp’s “Real-Time GPS Tracker” (https://www.gree-
nalp.com/RealTimeTracker/), Map My Tracks (http://www.mapmytracks.com/sports/
running), and Revel Mob’s “Where M I” (http://www.revelmob.com/blog/real-time-
tracking-iphone-app-perfect-marathoners).
289. See Sanja Kapidzic, Narcissism as a Predictor of Motivations Behind Facebook
Profile Picture Selection, J. CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAV., & SOC. NETWORKING
(2012), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23249240.
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providers of these services that their data and information can be re-
stricted according to each user’s preferences.
This is the irony of the “information age.”  Information is more val-
uable than ever, and yet, on a personal level, we seem to give it up
more freely than ever.  A corollary to the open, sharing society is the
effect that such behavior has on societal notions of privacy.  As this
forms a key determinate as to the reasonable expectations of privacy
under Supreme Court jurisprudence, society must examine whether
current trends in this area are the right path forward as the law
catches up to what people are actually doing.
V. AMENDMENTS TO REASONABLENESS AND FUTURE
PROTECTIONS OF PRIVACY
This final Part of the Article will juxtapose Part IV’s exploration of
private and commercial capabilities and behaviors with a sampling of
media reports concerning supposed law enforcement and intelligence
practices at the federal, state, and local levels.290  As explained further
below, any potential parity between non-government technologies
and practices with government counterparts does not end, but can in-
form the inquiry into what properly can be considered citizens’ rea-
sonable expectations of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes.
As discussed in Part III, the October 2001 passage of the Patriot
Act ushered in an era of increasingly intertwined U.S. national secur-
ity and criminal law enforcement practices, particularly with respect to
counterterrorism efforts.  This began a somewhat paradoxical period
for law, policy, and public discourse—on the one hand, increased fo-
cus on security (both domestic and abroad) became extremely high-
profile and sparked renewed public focus and debate on the scope of
governmental efforts to prevent attacks.  This included fundamentally
altering the FBI from an agency focused on the post-hoc investigations
of crimes into one driven to prevent any further attacks.291  Indeed,
the debates as early as Fall 2001 over the Patriot Act’s “library
records” provision highlight the vigor with which the scope of
290. Now that the reader has further context as to the scope and framework of this
Article, it bears repeating (as noted in the initial disclaimer at the beginning of this
Article) that the news media reports, opinions, and other similar content cited herein
that purport to discuss federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence prac-
tices, tactics, and technologies are not necessarily cited for the truth of the matters
they assert.  The Authors’ reliance upon such sources here is to recognize the report-
ing itself, and the public discussion about the reports; the selection of the articles cited
is meant to sample and be representative of public suppositions about technological
capabilities and their use, and should not be read to confirm the existence of any
particular program, technology, or practice, nor attest to the accuracy of how any such
program, technology, or practice’s deployment or use is described.
291. See JOHN ASHCROFT, NEVER AGAIN:  SECURING AMERICA AND RESTORING
JUSTICE 133 (2006); Robert S. Mueller III, American Bar Association Standing Com-
mittee on Law and National Security breakfast program (“The FBI:  Safeguarding
National Security”) keynote address, Feb. 24, 2015.
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counterterrorism programs were examined, more than a decade
before anybody had ever heard of Edward Snowden.  Not long after
the September 11 attacks, rumors about rendition programs, kinetic
targeting programs, and eventually cyber capabilities all became the
subjects of front-page news reports, lawsuits, and campaign stump
speeches.292
With much of the intelligence/criminal wall dismantled in law, pol-
icy, and public conscience, and with the consequential knowledge that
law enforcement and intelligence functions can interact in meaningful
ways in an era of ever-more-capable and prolific technological tools,
the Kyllo test would imply it is reasonable to suspect that certain high-
tech measures might be used in the law enforcement context, notwith-
standing their development for intelligence purposes.  Further, if ca-
pabilities or activities that are supposed to be secret are readily
discussed out in the open, it is possible that, too, has Fourth Amend-
ment implications.  The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”)
has adopted a corollary argument in FOIA litigation over the secrecy
of alleged, publicly-referred-to targeting programs.293  Further, Kyllo’s
sliding scale for reasonableness, with respect to technological innova-
tions and graduated invasiveness based on the pervasiveness of tech-
nology and very publicly discussed intelligence collection authorities
in the Patriot Act and other public laws,294 appears to dictate that, as
technology develops and proliferates, reasonable expectations about
how that technology might be used also evolves.
Any contemporary discussion of government surveillance programs
generally begins with the materials attributed to Snowden, published
starting in June 2013.295  Among other things, the leaks gave impetus
292. See, e.g., Dana Priest and Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends
Interrogations; ‘Stress and Duress’ Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret
Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2002) (cited by Bootie Cosgrove-Mather,
“Outsourcing Torture,” CBS NEWS OPINION (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.cbsnews
.com/2100-215_162-619513.html); Campaigners Demand US ‘Torture’ Probe, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 27, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2607629.stm; Adam R.
Pearlman, Legality of Lethality:  Paradigm Choice and Targeted Killings in Counter-
terrorism Operations (Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1583985; Adam R. Pearlman, Federal Cybersecurity Programs (May
7, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1655105.
293. See ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Raffaela Wakeman, Appel-
lant Brief Filed in ACLU v. CIA (Drone Program FOIA Request), LAWFARE (Mar. 16,
2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/appellant-brief-filed-aclu-v-cia-drone-program-
foia-request (summarizing the ACLU’s arguments).
294. We should note early on in this discussion that, although a lack of secrecy
(a/k/a, public knowledge) logically impacts expectations, and the resulting conversa-
tion is, perhaps, legally relevant in the Fourth Amendment context, any doctrine ac-
cepting this proposition should be careful not to incentivize leaks as a means of
deliberately degrading privacy expectations.  We would expect, however, that security
concerns would seem to be a natural check against such practice.
295. In 1984, then-Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew said:
Because American officials release secrets, that is supposed to be the ‘in’
thing.  It shows that yours is a free society where if any ministers or courts
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to rebooting the presidentially appointed Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (“PCLOB”), created by IRTPA in 2004296 but dor-
mant since 2008.297  Snowden’s leaks included information related to
collection under the Patriot Act’s “library records” provision and sec-
tion 702 of the amended FISA that provided broadly for the targeting
of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.298  Under
the authority of section 215 of the Patriot Act, “the NSA collects tele-
phone call records or metadata—but not the content of phone conver-
sations—covering the calls of most Americans on an ongoing basis,
subject to renewed approvals by the [FISC].”299  Separately, under
section 702 of the FISA, “the government collects the contents of
electronic communications, including telephone calls and emails,
where the target is reasonably believed to be a non-U.S. person lo-
cated outside the United States.”300
A few months after those disclosures, the Justice Department began
disclosing to certain criminal defendants instances in which some in-
formation derived from warrantless intelligence-driven surveillance
led to evidence later used against them in court.301  Ever since, there
suppress the truth you feel it is your duty to leak it to the opposition.  That is
something new, and it is not proven.  So when you tamper around with the
fundamentals of society . . . the effects are in the next, and often after the
next, generation.
Adam R. Pearlman, Vision and Leadership:  A Review of ‘Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand
Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World, Interviews and Selec-
tions,’ 16 ENGAGE 67, 72 n.6 (2015) (quoting LEE KUAN YEW:  THE GRAND
MASTER’S INSIGHTS ON CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE WORLD (2013)).  We
leave it to the reader to opine about how prophetic on this point Lee may have been.
296. Pub. L. 108-458 § 1061.
297. The PCLOB’s chairman, its only full-time member, was confirmed by the Sen-
ate five days before the first article on the Snowden material began to appear in the
press.  The other four members, also Senate-confirmed appointees who were con-
firmed earlier, serve part-time.  To be sure, the timing of the confirmation of the
Board’s chairman is coincidental; the sudden reliance on that body by other parts of
the government, however, is not.
298. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a).
299. REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SEC-
TION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT, PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT
BOARD, at *1 (2014), available at https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the_
Telephone_Records_Program.pdf.  Board member Rachel Brand’s separate state-
ment analyzing the section 215 program is available at https://www.pclob.gov/library/
215-Brand_Statement.pdf; Board Member Elizabeth Collins Cook’s separate state-
ment regarding that provision is at https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Cook_State
ment.pdf.
300. REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SEC-
TION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, at *1 (2014), available at https://www.pclob.gov/li-
brary/702-Report.pdf.
301. See Federal Prosecutors, in a Policy Shift, Cite Warrantless Wiretaps as Evi-
dence, NY TIMES (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/us/federal-prose
cutors-in-a-policy-shift-cite-warrantless-wiretaps-as-evidence.html?hp&_r=1&.  Dis-
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also has been a constant flow of public reporting of official statements,
purported leaks, and mere speculation alike that suggest extraordi-
nary technological capabilities, either in operation now or hoped for
in the future.  This includes collecting information remotely from
“connected gadgets,”302 tracking and analyzing potential threats and
uncovering evidence of crimes through social media,303 monitoring
traffic to certain media sites,304 and the use of facial recognition
software to scan websites for pictures of criminal suspects.305  These
reports have been accompanied by an explosion in the proliferation of
cameras—both stationary and mobile, including the use of unmanned
aerial equipment (i.e., “drones”)306 and camera-equipped street
closure of the fact of FISA-derived evidence, however, does not necessarily entitle a
defendant access to the underlying materials. See U.S. v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479 (7th
Cir. 2014) (reversing district court’s granting cleared defense counsel access to FISA
application materials).
302. Rob Waugh, The CIA Wants to Spy on you Through your TV:  Agency Direc-
tor Says Net-Connected Gadgets will ‘Transform’ Surveillance, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 16,
2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2115871/The-CIA-wants-spy-
TV-Agency-director-says-net-connected-gadgets-transform-surveillance.html.
303. Helen A.S. Popkin, Careful What you Tweet:  Police, Schools Tap Social Media
to Track Behavior, NBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/
careful-what-you-tweet-police-schools-tap-social-media-track-4B11215908 (“While
criminals — or those guilty of ill-placed sarcasm — aren’t wising up about social me-
dia oversharing, tools for monitoring Americans online are increasingly accessible and
affordable to authorities, no NSA-level clearance required.”); Gerry Shih, U.S. Police
Behind Most Requests for Twitter Information, REUTERS (July 2, 2012), http://www
.reuters.com/article/2012/07/02/us-twitter-requests-idUSBRE8611EY20120702.
304. Steve Watson, Group Forces Congressional Hearing on Big Sis’ Twitter,
Drudge Spying, INFOWARS (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.infowars.com/group-forces-con-
gressional-hearing-on-big-sis-twitter-drudge-spying/ (reporting a congressional hear-
ing into alleged DHS tracking of traffic to, inter alia, The Huffington Post and The
Drudge Report).
305. Murray Weiss, High-Tech NYPD Unit Track Criminal Through Facebook and
Instagram Photos, DNAINFO  (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/
20130325/new-york-city/high-tech-nypd-unit-tracks-criminals-through-facebook-in-
stragram-photos.
306. For examples of reporting on surveillance camera-equipped drones, see, e.g.,
Charles Feldman, FAA to Ease Rules for Police Agencies to Fly Unmanned Drones,
CBS LOS ANGELES (May 15, 2012), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2012/05/15/faa-to-
ease-rules-for-police-agencies-to-fly-unmanned-drones/; Is the NYPD Experimenting
with Drones Over the City?  Evidence Points to Yes, CBS NEW YORK (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/01/23/is-the-nypd-experimenting-with-drones-over-
the-city-evidence-points-to-yes/; Brian Bennett, Police Employ Predator Drone Spy
Planes on Home Front, L.A. TIMES, (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/news/
nationworld/nation/la-na-drone-arrest-20111211,0,324348.story; Steve Watson, Air
Force Document:  Drones Can Be Used to Spy on Americans, INFO WARS (May 11,
2012), http://www.infowars.com/air-force-document-drones-can-be-used-to-spy-on-
americans/; Jack Cafferty, Should Drones Be Used to Spy on Americans?, CNN (May
15, 2012), http://caffertyfile.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/15/should-drones-be-used-to-spy-
on-americans/?hptHP_t2; Charles Feldman, The Age of Drones:  Military May be Us-
ing Drones in U.S. to Help Police, CBS LOS ANGELES (June 4, 2012), http://
losangeles.cbslocal.com/2012/06/04/the-age-of-drones-military-may-be-using-drones-
in-us-to-help-police/; Kurt Nimo, EPA Using Drones to Spy on Cattle Ranchers in
Nebraska and Iowa, INFO WARS (June 4, 2012), http://www.infowars.com/epa-using-
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lights307 that offer multiple platforms for vehicle license plate identifi-
cation308 and facial recognition.309  The ubiquity of smartphones and
drones-to-spy-on-cattle-ranchers-in-nebraska-and-iowa/; Kris Gutierrez, Drone Gives
Texas Law Enforcement Bird’s-Eye View on Crime, FOX NEWS (Nov. 16, 2011), http://
www.foxnews.com/us/2011/11/16/drone-gives-texas-law-enforcement-birds-eye-view-
on-crime/.  Advancements in technology are reportedly allowing for airborne equip-
ment and their cinematographic payloads to be manufactured at ever-smaller scales,
making them increasingly difficult to notice or otherwise detect. See, e.g., Is That
Really Just a Fly?  Swarms of Cyborg Insect Drones are the Future of Military Surveil-
lance, DAILY MAIL (June 20, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-
2161647/Is-really-just-fly-Swarms-cyborg-insect-drones-future-military-surveillance
.html.
307. Paul Joseph Watson, New Street Lights to Have ‘Homeland Security’ Applica-
tions,  INFOWARS (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.infowars.com/new-street-lights-to-have-
homeland-security-applications/ (discussing street lights designed such that their “pri-
mary capabilities” include “energy conservation, homeland security, public safety,
traffic control, advertising, video surveillance.”); Paul Joseph Watson, Talking Surveil-
lance Cameras Coming to U.S. Streets, INFOWARS (May 14, 2012), http://www.in-
fowars.com/talking-surveillance-cameras-coming-to-u-s-streets/ (reporting the units
being installed in Chicago, Detroit, and Pittsburg).
308. Police License Plate Scanners Record Driver’s Locations, AUTOBLOG (June 28,
2013), http://www.autoblog.com/2013/06/28/police-license-plate-scanners-record-driv-
ers-locations/?icid=maing-grid7%257Cmain5%257Cdl2%257Csec1_lnk2%2526pLid
%253D338326; Secret Federal Government Program Tracks Millions of Motorists,
AUTOBLOG (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.autoblog.com/photos/secret-federal-govern-
ment-program-tracks-millions-of-motorists; Ellen Nakashima & Josh Hicks, Home-
land Security is Seeking a National License Plate Tracking System, WASH. POST (Feb.
18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/homeland-security-
is-seeking-a-national-license-plate-tracking-system/2014/02/18/56474ae8-9816-11e3-
9616-d367fa6ea99b_story.html (this particular plan was scuttled the day after this re-
port appeared; see Ellen Nakashima & Josh Hicks, Department of Homeland Security
Cancels National License-Plate Tracking Plan, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/dhs-cancels-national-license-plate-
tracking-plan/2014/02/19/a4c3ef2e-99b4-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html); Allison
Klein & Josh White, License Plate Readers:  A Useful Tool for Police Comes with
Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lo-
cal/license-plate-readers-a-useful-tool-for-police-comes-with-privacy-concerns/2011/
11/18/gIQAuEApcN_print.html; Larry Copeland, Not Just Tolls:  E-Z Pass Keeping
an Eye on Speeders, USA TODAY (Dec. 20, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/nation/2014/12/19/ez-pass-and-speeding/20558251/ (noting that E-Z Pass claims
not to pass info to law enforcement for ticketing purposes, such as timestamp data
between fixed-distance toll booths, but the capability is there, as is the raw location
data); DEA Chief:  US Abandoned Plans to Track Cars Near Gun Shows, FOX NEWS
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/01/28/dea-chief-us-abandoned-
plan-to-track-cars-near-gun-shows/?intcmp=latestnews; Chris Halsne Mysterious Spy
Cameras Collecting Data at Post Offices, FOX 31 DENVER (Mar. 12, 2015), http://kdvr
.com/2015/03/11/mysterious-spy-cameras-collecting-data-at-post-offices/  (noting that
the Postal Inspection Service was reportedly using cameras to record customers’ cars
leaving a Denver-area post office parking lot).
309. See Allya Sternstein, FBI to Launch Nationwide Facial Recognition Service,
NEXTGOV (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20111007_6100.php?
oref=rss (regarding the Next-Generation Identification system); Massive FBI Facial
Recognition Database Poses Threat to Privacy, Group Says, FOX NEWS (Apr. 16,
2014), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2014/04/16/massive-fbi-facial-recognition-data
base-threat-to-privacy-group-says/?intcmp=obnetwork (same).
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similar devices allegedly further enables the possibility of real-time
tracking nearly anyone, anywhere, at any time.310
Internet search giant Google says surveillance is “on the rise”311 at
a rate that could “break the Internet,”312 even as it performs law en-
forcement functions itself by scanning not only the text of the emails
its account holders send and receive but also the content of associated
attachments.313  The arguable hypocrisy from that company and
others does not end there—several reports have surfaced describing
web-based companies’ psychological experimentation on and social
engineering of unwitting subjects: their customer base.314  The so-
called Net-Neutrality debate also became a thinly veiled proxy war for
whether Internet Service Providers would gain greater leverage to po-
tentially manipulate consumer behavior by restricting access to certain
websites, particularly streaming platforms, in exchange for higher
fees.315  And even while funding studies to buttress its position that
users’ search results deserve protections under the First Amendment,
310. Paul Joseph Watson, Mandatory ‘Big Brother’ Boxes in All New Cars From
2015, INFOWARS (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.infowars.com/mandatory-big-brother-
black-boxes-in-all-new-cars-from-2015/; Gerry Smith, Robert Mueller Can’t Rule Out
FBI Obtained Data From Carrier IQ, HUFF. POST (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2011/12/14/robert-mueller-fbi-carrier-iq_n_1148700.html; Catherine
Crump, Are the Police Tracking Your Calls?,  CNN (May 22, 2012), http://www.cnn
.com/2012/05/22/opinion/crump-cellphone-privacy/index.html?hptHP_t2; Secret US
Spy Program Targeted Americans’ Cellphones, FOX NEWS (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www
.foxnews.com/politics/2014/11/14/secret-us-spy-program-targeted-americans-cell-
phones/ (USMS program for law enforcement purposes) ; Delvin Barrett, CIA Aided
Program to Spy on U.S. Cellphones, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/cia-gave-justice-department-secret-phone-scanning-technology-1426009924;
David Sherfinski, Congress Demands Answers on Feds’ Cellphone Tracking by Simu-
lator Towers, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2014/dec/31/leahy-grassley-wants-answers-from-doj-dhs-on-cell-/.
311. Jennifer Martinez, Google:  Surveillance ‘Is on the Rise,’ THE HILL (Nov. 12,
2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/267591-google-us-made-near
ly-8000-requests-for-user-data.
312. Trevor Mogg, Google Chief Fears Surveillance Could ‘Break the Internet,’ FOX
NEWS (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2014/10/09/google-chief-fears-sur-
veillance-scandal-could-break-internet/?intcmp=features.
313. See, e.g., Martin Evans, Paedophile Snared as Google Scans Gmail for Images
of Child Abuse, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 4, 2014, 8:10 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/news/11012008/Paedophile-snared-as-Google-scans-Gmail-for-images-of-
child-abuse.html; see also supra note 254.
314. See, e.g., Micah L. Sifry, Facebook Wants You to Vote on Tuesday.  Here’s
How It Messed with Your Feed in 2012, MOTHERJONES (Oct. 31, 2014, 5:00 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/can-voting-facebook-button-improve-
voter-turnout; Julian Hattem, Fed-Backed Twitter Study Draws Fire, THE HILL (Oct.
18, 2014, 2:57 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/221182-fed-backed-twitter-
study-draws-fire; Kashmir Hill, OkCupid Lied to Users About Their Compatibility as
an Experiment, FORBES (July 28, 2014, 5:44 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kashmirhill/2014/07/28/okcupid-experiment-compatibility-deception/.
315. See also David Goldman, Slow Comcast Speeds Were Costing Netflix Custom-
ers, CNN MONEY (Aug. 29, 2014, 10:18 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/08/29/tech-
nology/netflix-comcast/index.html?hptHP_bn5.
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Google was being investigated by Federal Trade Commission staff for
manipulating those same results.316
There certainly is bona fide pushback on some of the government’s
uses of technology, however, from both the legislative and judicial
branches, and citizens alike.  During the drafting and editing of this
Article, Congress considered several privacy- and surveillance-related
legislative proposals, including the ‘USA Freedom’ Act and the Email
Privacy Act.  The Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling
Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring (USA
FREEDOM) Act of 2015,317 which became law on June 2, 2015, in-
cludes provisions that cabin bulk records collection previously con-
ducted under section 215 of the Patriot Act to collection based on
“specific selection terms,” prohibits the use of intelligence collected
under section 702 of FISA in court proceedings against United States
persons if FISC deems the collection procedure to be “deficient,” and
increases transparency of the FISA litigation process via declassifica-
tion and amicus provisions.318  The Email Privacy Act,319 which (like
the original version of the USA Freedom Act) failed to pass during
the 113th Congress, intended to alter the provision of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 that “extends Fourth Amend-
ment protections against unreasonable search and seizure only to elec-
tronic communications sent or received fewer than 180 days” prior to
being sought by investigators.320  As the law now stands, any informa-
tion (emails, text messages, pictures, documents) stored on remote
servers for longer than 180 days are considered abandoned and are
subject to administrative subpoenas; they are not deemed protected
by the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
In related judicial developments, the Supreme Court has ruled that
police cannot apply a GPS tracking unit to a suspect’s vehicle without
a warrant321 and normally cannot search the content of a suspect’s cell
phone, even as incident to arrest, absent independent magisterial find-
ing of probable cause.322  An expansive reading of Jones could even
316. Compare Kim Zetter, Search Results Protected by First Amendment, Google-
Funded Analysis Says, WIRED (May 9, 2012, 3:47 PM), http://www.wired.com/threat
level/2012/05/google-first-amendment/, with Rolfe Winkler & Brody Mullins, How
Google Skewed Search Results, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2015, 7:25 PM), http://www.wsj
.com/articles/how-google-skewed-search-results-1426793553.
317. Pub. L. 114-23 (2015).
318. See also Jodie Liu, So What Does the USA Freedom Act Do Anyway?,
LAWFARE (June 3, 2015, 5:29pm), https://www.lawfareblog.com/so-what-does-usa-
freedom-act-do-anyway.
319. Email Privacy Act, H.R.1852, 113th Cong. (2013–14).
320. Lindsay Wise, Government Wonders:  What’s in Your Old Emails?,
MCCLATCHY DC (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2015/02/11/256304/gov
ernment-wonders-whats-in-your.html.
321. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
322. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (noting that “[T]he fact that
technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not
make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders
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imply that police cannot use technology as a complete replacement for
allocating human resources to traditional law enforcement tasks.323
Multiple states’ high courts have ruled a warrant is also required to
track phone location data.324  And some trial courts, too, are requiring
more scrutiny of the technological means by which some evidence is
procured, to such an extent that prosecutors have felt compelled to
offer generous plea deals to avoid discovery and Brady challenges.325
The public, too, has not merely been vocal about its apprehension
regarding the use of surveillance technologies, such as drones326 and
facial recognition,327 but also is increasingly utilizing encryption tech-
niques to shield the contents of communications from undesired sur-
veillance.328  Many people have also “unplugged” from social media
fought.”).  For a learned summary of the 2014 Riley decision, with context, see Daniel
J. Solove, Does the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision on the 4th Amendment and Cell




323. See also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2 (2001).  This might include,
for example, fully automated speed cameras. See also text accompanying note 41,
supra, regarding concrns about “lazy” law enforcement.
324. Debra Cassens Weiss, Cops Need a Warrant to Track Cellphone Location
Data, a Second State High Court Says, ABA J. (Feb. 19, 2014, 2:21 PM), http://www
.abajournal.com/news/article/cops_need_a_warrant_to_track_cellphone_location_
data_a_second_state_high_co/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_cam
paign=tech_monthly (describing New Jersey and Massachusetts high court rulings
finding unreasonable searches and seizures under their respective states’
constitutions).
325. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Secrecy Around Police Surveillance Equipment
Proves a Case’s Undoing, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/national-security/secrecy-around-police-surveillance-equipment-proves-a-
cases-undoing/2015/02/22/ce72308a-b7ac-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story
.html?hpid=z1 (Florida judge ordered production of StingRay in case against defen-
dant charged with robbery with a deadly weapon, which carried a four-year sentence.
Prosecution refused, and cut a deal for six-months of probation.  The judge is re-
ported to have asked the prosecution at a pre-trial hearing, “What right does law
enforcement have to hide behind the rules and to listen in and take people’s informa-
tion like the NSA?”).  The New York Civil Liberties Union has also won a suit to
compel disclosure of Stingray capabilities. See Kendra Eaglin, NYCLU Releases De-
tails of EC Sheriff’s Cell Phone Spying, WKBW BUFFALO (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:09 PM),
http://www.wkbw.com/news/nyclu-releases-details-of-ec-sheriffs-cell-phone-spying.
326. Gordon Tokumatsu & Jeanne Kuang, City Hall Protesters Demand “Drone-
Free LAPD,” NBC4 S. CAL. (Aug. 21, 2014, 2:03 PM), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/
news/local/City-Hall-Protesters-Demand-Drone-Free-LAPD-272202761.html; Kraut-
hammer on Drones Flying in US:  “Stop It Here, Stop It Now,” REAL CLEAR POLITICS
(May 14, 2012), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2012/05/14/krauthammer_on_
drones_flying_in_us_stop_it_here_stop_it_now.html.
327. John D. Sutter, How to Hide from Face-Detection Technology, CNN (Apr. 29,
2012, 10:25 AM), http://whatsnext.blogs.cnn.com/2012/04/29/how-to-hide-from-face-
detection-technology/?hptHP_c2.
328. See, e.g., New Encryption Technology Hits Nerve with DOJ, FOX NEWS (Nov.
20, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2014/11/20/new-encryption-technology-hits-
nerve-with-doj/?intcmp=latestnews; Jose Pagliery, FBI Director:  iPhones Shields[sic]
Pedophiles from Cops, CNN MONEY (Oct. 14, 2014, 10:17 AM), http://money.cnn
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networks (or at least attempted to), citing privacy and lifestyle rea-
sons.329  Even former Secretary of the Department of Homeland Se-
curity Tom Ridge has said he “[doesn’t] want the NSA looking at [his]
emails.”330
But the pushback is far from uniform or consistent.  Democratically
elected representatives and chief executives at all levels of govern-
ment continue to ensure broad surveillance authorities,331 and courts
have upheld many of the programs and the secrecy surrounding
them.332  Even public opinion indicates greater acceptance of contro-
versial and arguably intrusive technological means to catch
.com/2014/10/13/technology/security/fbi-apple/index.html?hptHP_t2; Pamela Brown &
Evan Perez, FBI Tells Apple, Google Their Privacy Efforts Could Hamstring Investi-
gations, CNN POLITICS (Oct. 12, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/25/politics/fbi-ap-
ple-google-privacy.  For a particularly thoughtful, brief discussion on the increasing
use of encryption tools, also known as “going dark,” see Carrie Cordero, Weighing In
on the Encryption and “Going Dark” Debate, LAWFARE (Dec. 4, 2014, 11:30 AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/12/weighing-in-on-the-encryption-and-going-dark-
debate/.
329. Anick Jesdanun, As Facebook Grows, Millions Say ‘No, Thanks,’ FOX NEWS
(May 17, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2012/05/17/as-facebook-grows-mil-
lions-say-no-thanks/; Jenna Wortham, Shunning Facebook, and Living to Tell About
It, CNBC (Dec. 13, 2011, 4:34 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/45659248 (relaying the
stories of several former Facebook accountholders who deactivated their accounts).
330. Mara Siegler, Ex-Homeland Secretary:  ‘I Don’t Want the NSA Looking at My
Emails,’ NYPOST.COM (Oct. 20, 2013, 3:41 AM), http://pagesix.com/2013/10/30/ridge-
doesnt-want-the-nsa-looking-at-his-emails/?_ga=1.221059551.619747476.1382834287.
331. Mark Hosenball, U.S. Spies Press for Renewal of Broad Electronic Surveillance
Law, REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/11/
usa-electronicspying-idUSL1E8KBCW620120911; David Kravets, Calif. Governor
Veto Allows Warrantless Cellphone Searches, WIRED (Oct. 10, 2011, 11:09 AM), http://
www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/warrantless-phone-searches/; Brown Vetoes Bill
Limiting Drone Surveillance, CBS SACRAMENTO (Sept. 28, 2014, 7:42 PM), http://sac-
ramento.cbslocal.com/2014/09/28/brown-vetoes-bill-limiting-drone-surveillance; FAA
to Ease Rules for Police Agencies to Fly Unmanned Drones, CBS L.A. (May 15, 2012,
8:16 AM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2012/05/15/faa-to-ease-rules-for-police-agen-
cies-to-fly-unmanned-drones/.  There are some instances where it seems clear legisla-
tors are passing funding for controversial surveillance equipment for purely political
reasons (what political scientists might call “pork barrel”). See, e.g., Katie Drum-
mond, DHS Doesn’t Want Its New Spy Drones, WIRED (Nov. 1, 2011, 6:39 PM), http://
www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/11/dhs-unwanted-drones/
?mbid=ob_ppc_dangerroom.
332. Jason Koebler, Court Upholds Domestic Drone Use in Arrest of American Citi-
zen, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 2, 2012, 11:32 AM), http://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2012/08/02/court-upholds-domestic-drone-use-in-arrest-of-american-citi-
zen; Dustin Volz, NSA Spying Wins Another Rubber Stamp, NAT’L J. (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/nsa-spying-wins-another-rubber-stamp-
20150227; U.S. Spy Agency Can Keep Mum on Google Ties:  Court, YAHOO! NEWS
(May 12, 2012), available at https://sg.news.yahoo.com/us-spy-agency-keep-mum-
google-ties-court-195145718.html (discussing secrecy of NSA/Google relationship);
Number of Court-Approved Wiretaps Soared in 2010, FOX NEWS (Aug. 20, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/08/20/number-court-approved-wiretaps-soared-
in-2010/?intcmp=obinsite.
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criminals,333 although it draws the line at other administrative func-
tions of government, like speeding tickets.334  Shortly after the
Snowden leaks, the popular satirical publication The Onion
lampooned those expressing outrage over the NSA’s purported activi-
ties in articles including Area Man Outraged His Private Information
Being Collected By Someone Other Than Advertisers,335 and Terrorist
Living In U.S. Gets Why NSA Spying Such A Complicated Issue.336
The acceptance of privacy-sacrificing technologies is also only grow-
ing more prevalent with time and is profoundly different across gener-
ation gaps, with younger Americans increasingly desensitized to what
their parents might have seen as unacceptable intrusions upon their
privacy.337  Even the proposed Email Privacy Act discussed above
does not include communications metadata in its increased protec-
tions, despite the controversy around the NSA’s telephony metadata
program studied by the PCLOB.  And some scholars have advocated
for the easing of bureaucratic restrictions and the higher-than-consti-
tutionally-required burden FISA imposes on the government.338  This
opinion is not merely driven by American technological hegemony;
333. Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, American’s Attitudes About Privacy, Security &
Surveillance, PEW RESEARCH CENTER INTERNET, SCIENCE & TECH (May 20, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-
and-surveillance/ (discussing results of March 2015 Pew study regarding American’s
attitudes concerning digital life); Dave Helling, Acceptance of a Semi-Public Digital
Life Worries Privacy Advocates, KANSAS CITY STAR (Mar. 29, 2015), available at
http://multimedia.thehawkeye.com/story/BC-CPT-ONLINE-PRIVACY-KC————
national—1200-words—03-29-071623.
334. Poll:  Catching Criminals Is Fine, But Don’t Use Drones for Speeding Tickets,
Americans Say, CNN (June 13, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/13/
poll-catching-criminals-is-fine-but-dont-use-drones-for-speeding-tickets-americans-
say/?hptHP_c1; see also supra text accompanying note 332.
335. Area Man Outraged His Private Information Being Collected by Someone
Other Than Advertisers, THE ONION (June 11, 2013), http://www.theonion.com/arti
cles/area-man-outraged-his-private-information-being-co,32783/.
336. Terrorist Living in U.S. Gets Why NSA Spying Such a Complicated Issue, THE
ONION (June 11, 2013), http://www.theonion.com/articles/terrorist-living-in-us-gets-
why-nsa-spying-such-a,32788/.
337. See also Madden & Rainie, supra note 333; Heather Kelly, Survey:  Will We
Give Up Privacy Without a Fight?, CNN (Dec. 18, 2014, 10:05 AM), http://www.cnn
.com/2014/12/18/tech/innovation/pew-future-of-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_bn5; Wor-
tham, supra note 329 (noting “[society’s adoption of] new behaviors and expectations
in response to the near-ubiquity of Facebook and other social networks” that increase
the pressure to share personal information via social media); Dylan Stableford, ‘Who
is Rodney King?’ ‘Who is Dick Clark?’ ‘The Titanic was Real?!?!’ How Death, Major
News Events Expose Twitter’s Generation Gap, YAHOO! NEWS (June 19, 2012, 7:08
AM), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/the-cutline/rodney-king-dick-clark-titanic-real-
death-major-110858944.html (discussing the generation gap with respect to both
knowledge and expectations); Sarah B. Weir, 10 Things You Don’t Know about Teens
and Social Networking, YAHOO! ENT. (Aug. 17, 2011), https://en-maktoob.entertain
ment.yahoo.com/blogs/parenting/10-things-you-dont-know-about-teens-and-social-
networking-2527367.html.
338. See, e.g., Ronald J. Sievert, Time to Rewrite the Ill-Conceived and Dangerous
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 3 NAT. SEC. L.J. 47 (2014).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\2-4\TWL408.txt unknown Seq: 61 11-MAR-16 10:51
2015] NATIONAL SECURITY AND KYLLO 779
rather, in many respects, U.S. government surveillance practices are
less invasive than those of other democracies.339
Considering everything discussed in this Article—private-sector
surveillance and data collection capabilities, society’s increased reli-
ance on the convenience of communications technology despite those
well-publicized practices and known vulnerabilities,340 the equally
well-known demise of the intelligence/law enforcement wall, and in-
consistent steps taken by both political actors and private citizens with
respect to evincing a desire for greater privacy—it appears that the
constitutional reasonable-expectation-of-privacy concept as the Su-
preme Court thought of it in Katz is, empirically speaking, a legal
fiction.
Even so, that notion does not end the legal inquiry as the absence of
“constitutionally protected area”341 is not necessarily the coup de
339. Although many other countries, including U.S. allies, have cited privacy con-
cerns in complaints of reported U.S. government surveillance practices, many of those
countries have robust domestic intelligence agencies with invasive surveillance prac-
tices. See Sievert, supra note 338, at 82–92 (describing authorities in Germany, the
United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Italy); Mark H. Gitenstein, Nine Democracies
and the Problems of Detention, Surveillance, and Interrogation, in LEGISLATING THE
WAR ON TERROR:  AN AGENDA FOR REFORM (Benjamin Wittes, ed. 2009) (describ-
ing Australia, France, Germany, India, Israel, Spain, South Africa, and the United
Kingdom).  The peculiarity of the complaints in light of those counties’ own domestic
intelligence surveillance powers is heightened by the antitrust actions taken against
U.S. tech companies, which suggests the supposed privacy concerns may be driven, at
least in part, by competition policy in a field where businesses in those countries fall
behind U.S. companies’ technological capabilities. See also Danny Hakim, Google is
Target of European Backlash on U.S. Tech Dominance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/technology/google-is-target-of-european-back-
lash-on-us-tech-dominance.html?_r=0.  Indeed, even within the United States, con-
cerns over U.S. government surveillance sometimes conflate international opinion
with Americans’ privacy.  These are two independent questions—the former is a for-
eign policy issue; the latter is one of constitutional law. See also Patrick Tucker, NSA
Chief:  Yes, We Still Have Friends, DEFENSE ONE (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.defen-
seone.com/politics/2014/09/nsa-chief-yes-we-still-have-friends/94265/ (noting Admiral
Rogers’ remarks of continued strong foreign partnerships amid growing cyber
threats).
340. With respect to data vulnerability, noting that there may not be a reasonable
expectation of privacy in online communications in part because users cannot control
the third-party routing of the information is not to suggest that the legal analysis is
simply kowtow to bad actors with profound capabilities, such as criminal hackers.
Just because the public either knows of or can imagine certain empirical realities does
not mean we are forced to accept them as “reasonable” in the law.  That the Fourth
Amendment may not reach as far to protect online communications as we might like,
in part because of the inherent vulnerability of those communications, is not to simply
resign the Constitution in light of seemingly omnipresent and overwhelming criminal
or enemy elements.  It should never be required of American society to accept as
reasonable the malicious acts of people or organizations that aim to pilfer, abuse, or
take advantage of the freedoms our Constitution enshrines.  But such recognition is
important as an empirical baseline, and driving honest debates concerning the myriad
of technology-driven challenges to civil liberties.
341. See United States v. Knotts 460 U.S. 276, 285–88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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grace to privacy in general.342  Indeed, much of modern privacy is
based on statutory or regulatory regimes that might be said to parallel
tort law principles in making certain expectations reasonable per se.
A prime example of this concerns medical information, which is con-
sidered to be worthy of very stringent privacy protections.  The Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”),343 for ex-
ample, is partly the result of the general recognition that there is no
constitutional right to privacy in third party records, especially ones
that must be shared across businesses.  Similarly, the Genetic Infor-
mation Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”)344 applies HIPPA’s privacy
standards to genetic information345 and prohibits health insurance
companies from altering premiums and employers from making hiring
and firing decisions based upon genetic predispositions.346
In passing HIPAA and GINA, Congress has acted to legislate pri-
vacy-favoring policies into law, filling gaps left open in constitutional
jurisprudence.  It stands to reason, then, that Congress can similarly
act with respect to privacy in the realm of national security surveil-
lance and data collection.  Indeed, privacy advocates’ calls upon Con-
gress to “reign in” the NSA also betray an underlying recognition that
what that agency is accused of doing may not actually be unconstitu-
tional, even though it is subject to regulation in important respects.
Although plenary constitutional powers may limit Congress’s ability
to curtail national security intelligence collection and possibly reten-
tion and analysis if those functions are deemed similarly to fall within
the President’s Article II powers (though Congress would maintain
considerable discretion over funding those functions), Congress could
ensure that any surveillance or data gathered could only be used in
certain ways with respect to U.S. persons, including and especially
American citizens.347  If the Fourth Amendment and certain other
342. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 n.8 (2012) (“Fourth Amendment
protects against tresspassory searches only with regard to those items (‘persons,
houses, papers, and effects’) that it enumerates.”).  Thus, not all searches have consti-
tutional implications.
343. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
344. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110–233, 122
Stat. 881 (2008).
345. Id. § 105.
346. Id. §§ 101, 202.
347. Although not explored in depth here, it bears noting the differences in collec-
tion, retention, and usage of data, the last of which might include analysis, sharing, or
otherwise acting upon.  It is fundamental in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that
seizure must interfere with possessory rights, which certainly is not true of data collec-
tion nor surveillance. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.5.  The specific Fourth
Amendment question must thus be geared to what constitutes a search for the pur-
poses of that provision, and how that search does or does not violate reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy:  “obtaining information is not alone a search unless it is
achieved by such a trespass or invasion of privacy.” Id.
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provisions of the Bill of Rights (and the exclusionary rule348) are un-
derstood to be concerned primarily with protecting the liberty inter-
ests of American citizens against the coercive powers of government,
rules of evidence or procedure can easily be amended to exclude the
use of certain information in criminal prosecutions, or even certain
civil enforcement actions, without running afoul of any Separation of
Powers principles.  One example of such a legislative compromise, as
well as the generational pendulum of national security policymaking,
is already found in the history of FISA—the former “primary pur-
pose” rule that led to the intelligence/law enforcement wall, which the
Patriot Act amended to become the “significant purpose” standard.349
This implication of liberty interests is, of course, the major distinc-
tion between the private-sector capabilities discussed in Part IV and
government employment of the same or substantially similar means in
the exercise of its security functions.  Further, the Fourth Amendment
itself was written as protection from government intrusions,350 and
Americans reasonably should be able to expect that our government
adhere to our stated values.  Nevertheless, the Constitution builds in
this balancing test of reasonableness, which is properly analyzed in
light of how American society actually operates and how the Ameri-
348. Although the Supreme Court grounded its pronouncement of the exclusionary
rule in the Fourth Amendment, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389–99 (1914),
Justice Frankfurter later noted the rule “was not derived from the explicit require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment [nor] based on legislation expressing Congressional
policy in the enforcement of the Constitution.”  Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28
(1949), rev’d on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
349. We recognize the many drawbacks of a privacy regime governed largely by
statute and regulation.  Beyond the principle of the potentially uncomfortable con-
cept that “reasonable expectation” concept in constitutional law may not fit squarely
with today’s realities, several prudential downsides include a hyperactive legislature,
overreaching or overcomplicated regulations, the potential of slow and inefficient leg-
islative and judicial processes, separation of powers implications, and the potential
that classified exceptions may be made to promulgated regulations, including Execu-
tive Orders.  For further discussion on this last point, see JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE
COMMON DEFENSE:  NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES 78 (2007).  For
a discussion of how this concept might apply in another national security-related con-
text, see Pearlman, Legality of Lethality, supra note 292.  To those who think a statu-
tory fix in this regard ignores the Constitution, however, see Steve Vladeck, Professor
of Law at Am. Univ. Washington Coll. of Law, Presentation at the Texas A&M Law
Review Symposium: New Technology and Old Law Rethinking National Security
(Oct. 17, 2014) (commenting during the question and answer period after the presen-
tation), we unequivocally believe that the Constitution always matters, but so does
the manner in which we conduct ourselves in accordance with our values.  We note
that it is also part of our system of government to have a robust mechanism to impose
statutory limits on government activities, which increasingly seem to be the only avail-
able means of maintaining the legal fiction of privacy.  This Article has argued that,
even if Americans are lowering the constitutional bar by our actions, it may still be
possible to raise our expectations back up again with mere words through legislation.
350. Bear in mind that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review has
recognized an exception for foreign intelligence gathering. See In re Directives [re-
dacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
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can people really behave.  As the Supreme Court has held repeatedly
since Katz, “a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the govern-
ment violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recog-
nizes as reasonable.”351  The requisite societal recognition must be
more than mere vocalization of concern.
Despite the fact that hacking and data breaches are only expected
to continue to increase,352 we regularly “exchange[ ] privacy for con-
venience,”353 and further find ourselves in the midst of an explosion in
home-based connected technology, including cameras354 and micro-
phones,355 with life-like robots reportedly on the horizon,356 all of
which not only can be hacked as individual devices but also leave en-
tire in-home networks vulnerable.357  If two private citizens can build
a drone in their garage that can hack personal WiFi networks and lis-
ten to peoples’ phone calls for $6,000 using off-the-shelf electronics,358
351. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).  In his concurring opinions in
Fourth Amendment cases, Justice Alito repeatedly takes note of the peculiar chal-
lenges inherent in this standard.  In Jones, he wrote that expectation of privacy test
“involves a degree of circularity and judges are apt to confuse their own expectations
of privacy with the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks.”
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34).  With
respect to Riley v. California, he opined that “it would be very unfortunate if privacy
protection in the 21st century were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt
instrument of the Fourth Amendment.”  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497
(2014).
352. See, e.g., Jay Johnson, If 2014 Was the Year of the Data Breach, Brace for More,
FORBES (Jan. 2, 2015, 4:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/01/02/
if-2014-was-the-year-of-the-data-breach-brace-for-more/
?linkId=11477246&utm_channel=Business.
353. Paul Joseph Watson, New Microchip Knows Your Location to Within Centime-
ters, INFORWARS.COM (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.infowars.com/new-microchip-
knows-your-location-to-within-centimeters/ (“people have willingly exchanged their
privacy for convenience”); Kelly, supra note 337.
354. Magic Madzik, Rent-to-Own Laptops Secretly Photographed Users Having Sex,
FTC Says, WIRED, (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/09/laptop-rental-
spyware-scandal/.
355. Heather Kelly, Why Amazon’s Echo is the Computer of the Future, CNN (Nov.
13, 2014, 11:40 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/12/tech/innovation/amazon-echo-al
ways-listening/index.html?hpt=hp_t2.  Apple’s ‘Siri’ feature introduced on the iPhone
4S in 2011, and Microsoft’s XBox One also feature microphones with active listening
modes that constantly listen for commands directed at them via a natural language
user interface. Id.
356. Michael Fitzpatrick, The Hyper-Real Robots That Will Replace Receptionists,
Pop Stars. . . and Even Sex Dolls:  Unnervingly Human Androids Coming to a Future
Very Near You, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 20, 2014, 4:47 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-2841273/The-hyper-real-robots-replace-receptionists-pop-stars-sex-dolls-
Unnervingly-human-androids-coming-future-near-you.html.
357. See, e.g., Malia Zimmerman, Hacking into Your Home:  TVs, Refrigerators
Could be Portal to Most Sensitive Info, FOX NEWS (Apr. 18, 2015), http://www.fox
news.com/tech/2015/04/18/hacking-into-your-home-tvs-refrigerators-could-be-portal-
to-most-sensitive-info/; see also text accompanying note 287, supra.
358. See Erin Van der Bellen, Spy Drone Hacks WiFi Networks, Listens to Calls,
WUSA9 (Dec. 12, 2014, 12:42 PM), http://www.wusa9.com/story/news/local/2014/12/
11/spy-drone-hacking-cell-phones-text-messages/20214047/.
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and private companies boast of having better technology than govern-
ment agencies,359 the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kyllo unambigu-
ously suggests those facts to be relevant in whether it is permissible
for law enforcement to use similar equipment or means.  Even as peo-
ple continue to voice concerns about government activities while any
gaps between public and private technology capabilities dissipate, it
appears likely that the market is going to continue to support increas-
ingly invasive private capabilities.360
It is further relevant that the Fourth Amendment’s maximum force
applies to searches of the home and that a key factor in cases ex-
tending the Amendment’s protection in instances not implicating a
search of the home is the defendant’s taking affirmative steps to pro-
tect his privacy from eavesdroppers.  In Katz, for example, the defen-
dant shut the door to the phone booth.  In the context of electronic
communications, these two themes are often echoed with respect to
the use of user passwords to access and protect certain content.  Pass-
words are often compared to door locks and, like the additional step
of encryption, are unambiguous steps taken to protect one’s informa-
tion.361  Further, just because one knows and understands the possibil-
ity that the lock to his home might be picked does not mean he loses
his reasonable expectation of privacy in his home.362  But it does
strike us that there is something fundamentally different about locking
one’s door and leaving his property to the small chance that it will be
burgled, versus leaving otherwise private information on a server in an
unknown location, serviced by unknown persons, and protected by a
password that the user also has given to the same third-party care-
taker that manages that server.  If passwords are like door locks, then
those who maintain servers are merely house sitters, and if there can
be no constitutionally reasonable expectation of privacy against them
(though they might nevertheless be subject to criminal or civil liability
for theft or damages),363 then any argument that the government
359. See, e.g., Derrick Harris, Google:  Our New System for Recognizing Faces Is
the Best One Ever, FORTUNE, (Mar. 17, 2015, 5:05 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/03/17/
google-facenet-artificial-intelligence/.
360. See Kelly, supra note 337 (quoting Janna Anderson Elon Imagining the In-
ternet Center, Director “people have proven that they will give away personal infor-
mation for something as small as a free cup of coffee.”).
361. The Eleventh Circuit has even accorded constitutional protection to passwords
with respect to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. See In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335, 1341–42 (11th Cir.
2012) (holding that compelling a suspect in a child pornography investigation to pro-
vide his password to decrypt a hard drive would require him to engage in a testimo-
nial action in violation of his Fifth Amendment’s rights).
362. See also supra note 340.
363. Cf. Everett Rosenfeld, AT&T Data Breaches Revealed:  280k US Customers
Exposed, CNBC (Apr. 8, 2014, 1:19 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/102570147 (describ-
ing the Federal Communications Commission’s $25 million fine against AT&T for
consumer privacy violations, resulting from an investigation in which employees in
Mexico, the Philippines, and Colombia accessed over a quarter-million user accounts
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would be acting unconstitutionally by executing a lawful court order
compelling a relationship with that third-party that does not result in
material loss or tangible harm to the user, rings hollow.  Put bluntly,
the Internet, and especially “the cloud,” is not one’s home.  The clos-
est analogy is valet parking, and it would not seem reasonable to put
one’s most valuable assets—including documents with personal infor-
mation—into a vehicle about to be turned over to a valet.364
In Judge Keith’s district court opinion that the government ap-
pealed in the Keith case, he wrote, “The great umbrella of personal
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment has unfolded slowly, but
very deliberately, throughout our legal history.”365  At its core, how-
ever, the Fourth Amendment is a prophylactic measure devised to
check the uniquely extraordinary and coercive powers of the central
government of a post-Westphalian nation-state.  From that perspec-
tive, it is worth remembering that it did not even apply to the several
states until 1961.366  This Article has demonstrated that, today, the
electronic surveillance capabilities of the government are far from
“uniquely extraordinary,” and that the everyday actions of a signifi-
cant percentage of Americans include unambiguously relinquishing
control of very personal information in public and/or insecure commu-
nications that raise serious questions about the very existence of “pri-
vacy” as a factual predicate for modern Fourth Amendment analyses.
The characterization of the present debate as being about privacy as
an independent and monolithic notion may even do a disservice to the
probability of achieving a just and sound outcome within our constitu-
tional system.  Perhaps, rather, it is best conceptualized in terms of
determining the proper role of government and scope of its authori-
ties, as should be the starting point for virtually any domestic policy
analysis.  If privacy interests were the initial driver for our form of
limited government as enshrined in the Constitution, it seems illogical
simply to assert any particular government program violates privacy
without first taking account of the proper role(s) of government, and
its responsibilities to its citizens, in light of the grand bargain that be-
got the Constitution in the first instance.367
without authorization, and sold the account information to third-parties), available at
http://www.cnbc.com/id/102570147.
364. Cf. Scott Shane, Data Storage Could Expand Reach of Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2012, 5:50 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/14/ad-
vances-in-data-storage-have-implications-for-government-surveillance/?hp (Blog post
on The Caucus).
365. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1077 (D. Mich. 1971).
366. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 554–55 (1961).
367. But see Peggy Noonan, ‘A Nation of Sullen Paranoids’ Too Much Security Can
Produce a Kind of Madness, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2013, 6:53 PM), http://www.wsj
.com/articles/SB10001424127887324619504579029170678905440.
There are too many built-in dynamics that make the national-security state
want to grow, from legitimate fears of terrorism, to bureaucratic pride, to the
flaws in human nature.  And there are too many dynamics that will allow it
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The reality is that a certain degree of monitoring is, unfortunately,
necessary in this technology-driven age.  Although the development
of technology in the abstract is most often understood to be morally
neutral,368 technical means have been recognized as increasingly im-
portant complements to human intelligence collection,369 and surveil-
to grow.  The aftermath of 9/11 happened to coincide with a new burst in
American technological innovation and discovery:  The government has the
ways and means to do pretty much anything now, and if they can do it they
will do it.  If the citizens of the United States don’t put up a halting hand, the
government can’t be expected to:  It is in the nature of security professionals
to always want more, and since their mission is worthy they’re less likely to
have constitutional qualms, to dwell on such abstractions as abuse of the
Fourth Amendment and the impact of that abuse on the First.
Id.
368. See Albert C. Lin, Technology Assessment 2.0:  Revamping our Approach to
Emerging Technologies, 76 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1309, 1338–39 (2011) (“The predomi-
nant model of technology development, however, is for scientists and engineers to
conceive of technology instrumentally; that is, as value free and neutral, not based on
morals.” (citations omitted)). But see also Edward S. Dove, Back to Blood:  The Soci-
opolitics and Law of Compulsory DNA Testing of Refugees, 8 U. MASS. L. REV. 466,
500–01 (2013) (citing scholars who disagree with the supposed moral neutrality of
technology).  In this vein, it is important to be mindful of the threats technological
proliferation may pose to governments, as well.  For one, as illustrated above with
respect to the ACLU’s FOIA litigation about alleged targeted killings, technology is
proving repeatedly to be a tool for undermining government secrecy. See also Robert
Chesney, The Shadow War Is Not Very Shadowy, LAWFARE (June 14, 2012, 3:06 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/shadow-war-not-very-shadowy.  It has even been said
that the Internet “keeps the government honest.” See Shantanu Chauhan, Internet
Keeps Government Honest:  Google Chief, CYBER TECHNOLOGY NEWS (Nov. 13,
2011), http://cybertechnologynews.in/internet-keeps-government-honest-google-
chief/.  On the local level, interactions with police officers are now routinely video-
recorded.  Similar real-time exposure extends all the way to the realm of global af-
fairs, as perhaps best illustrated by Sohaib Athar’s live-tweeting of the Special Forces
operation that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden.  And, of course, technology
continues to be used in abjectly nefarious ways against the government, from denial
of service attacks to hacking for sensitive data, to targeting personnel. See, e.g., Ryan
Lovelace, Drones in Our Future, NAT’L REVIEW (Feb. 4, 2015, 5:54 PM), http://www
.nationalreview.com/article/397930/drones-our-future-ryan-lovelace (describing law
enforcement concerns about Mexican drug cartels using drones not just to transport
drugs, but to surveil officers.  “The biggest concerns about cartel-operated drones,
[Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent Matt] Barden says, have nothing to
do with the actual movements of drugs.  ‘Is it a good way to get some dope out of the
woods or out of the jungle to a waiting car or vehicle?  Yeah,’” Barden says.  ‘Better
yet, to me personally, is it a better way to perform surveillance on law enforcement?
Absolutely.  That scares me a whole lot more than does the smuggling aspect of it.’”);
Con Coughlin & Ben Farmer, Intelligence Agencies in ‘Technology Arms Race,’ THE
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11504
702/Intelligence-agencies-in-technology-arms-race.html (noting that “modern tech-
nology had been a boon for spy craft, but had also increased the risks to spies and
agents”).  Even individual legislators have felt their privacy imposed upon by technol-
ogy.  Alex Isenstadt, Lawmakers:  Candidates Almost Being Stalked, POLITICO (Aug.
3, 2012, 10:39 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0812/79328.html.
369. See also Greg Miller, CIA Looks to Expand Its Cyber Espionage Capabilities,
WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
cia-looks-to-expand-its-cyber-espionage-capabilities/2015/02/23/a028e80c-b94d-11e4-
9423-f3d0a1ec335c_story.html (noting Director Brennan sees cyber/tech as increas-
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lance-derived information has been credited with helping to prevent
numerous terrorist attacks.370  Another critical function of monitoring
Internet traffic in particular is cybersecurity—it would be impossible
to defend against cyber-attacks effectively if the intelligence agen-
cies are not allowed to leverage any capability that might have the
potential to touch upon otherwise presumptively private communi-
cations.371
If privacy is to be a legal fiction, it is one best maintained through
the vigilance of not only those charged with writing our laws and oth-
erwise actively protecting our security but also ourselves through the
conscious choices we make in how we interact with each other on both
social and commercial levels.  The importance of the debate includes
the need to be frank about the scope of permissible surveillance
targets, especially in counterterrorism scenarios.372  Further, as recog-
ingly intertwined with the human collection process, and describing what amounts to
Goldwater-Nichols-type reforms within the agency, using the directorates as talent
development mechanisms to farm personnel out to fusion/joint/hybrid centers that
blend the disciplines in effective ways, a la NCTC, which, of course, he used to direct).
370. See, e.g., Joseph Weber, Boehner Credits US Surveillance in Catching Capitol
Bomb Plot, FOX NEWS (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/01/15/
boehner-credits-us-surveillance-in-catching-capitol-bombing-plot/
?intcmp=latestnews.  One report by the Heritage Foundation counts sixty-four at-
tempted terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland since the September 11, 2001,
attacks, and predicts the rate of such plots to increase. See Malia Zimmerman, Think
Tank Tallies 64 Terror Plots Targeting American Homeland Since 9/11, FOX NEWS
(Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/03/31/think-tank-tallies-64-terror-
plots-targeting-american-homeland-since-11/.
371. See also Kim Zetter, McCain:  Cybersecurity Bill Ineffective Without NSA
Monitoring the Net, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2012, 7:21 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlev
el/2012/02/cybersecurity-act-of-2012/.  For a brief unclassified summary of the status
of U.S. cybersecurity initiatives and proposals before the Snowden disclosures, includ-
ing the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, see Adam R. Pearlman,
Federal Cybersecurity Programs, NEW FED. INITIATIVES PROJ., available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=1655105.
372. Determining the scope of permissible targets for counterterrorism surveillance
requires a clear notion of what “terrorism” is, and who is likely to participate in it.  It
is therefore notable that, there is no single, unified definition of “terrorism” in the
United States Code.  Coming to a consensus on the legal contours of that term has
been so elusive, even a volume dedicated to recommending legislative changes to va-
rious aspects of counterterrorism law that included chapters by some of the preemi-
nent scholars in national security law, lacked a proposal to do so. See Adam R.
Pearlman, Institutionalizing Counterterrorism:  A Review of Legislating the War on
Terror:  An Agenda for Reform, ENGAGE, Dec. 2010, at 107 (Benjamin Wittes, ed.),
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/institutionalizing-counterterror
ism-a-review-of-legislating-the-war-on-terror-an-agenda-for-reform-edited-by-benja-
min-wittes/ (“Although the conspicuous absence of a proffered single definition of
terrorism may simply indicate a common acceptance that we are in a fight with ene-
mies incapable of a one-size-fits-all legislative definition, its absence leaves open the
possibility of uneven, indeed perhaps even arbitrary, applications of the term.  Com-
mon colloquial usage does not sound policy make.  Rather, its greatest potential is to
feed the divisive fervor of political rhetoric used by those in ofice to justify extraordi-
nary uses of power by themselves, and leads to charges of fear-mongering by those
who are not.  Several authors in this book point out that dictators often begin their
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nized repeatedly in Supreme Court jurisprudence, there are funda-
mental differences between measures used in protecting those
interests that might be considered “domestic security”373 versus those
with a foreign nexus.  And the lone wolf dilemma will continue to
loom large, especially as copycats and those inspired by overseas ele-
ments increasingly pose real threats inside the United States.374
From Internet companies like Google375 and Facebook376 to cellular
service providers, cell phone “app” programmers, and vehicle manu-
tyranny by labeling dissenters as “terrorists,” and argue that the distinction between
liberty and security is a false one.  And in recalling the lessons of our own history,
perhaps best highlighted by the disdain with which we associate McCarthy-era black-
lists, we are reminded of the effect that labeling peoples and behaviors can have on
national political and policy priorities, and how they impact our well-being as a nation
under the rule of law. . . .”).
373. See, e.g., Keith, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).  On a related note, it is important to re-
member that, “for all the very important focus on national-level domestic intelligence
law and policy, on account of federal legal, political, and resource predominance, note
that there remains a lot of heterogeneity and local variation because most policing in
the United States is conducted and controlled at the local level.”  Matthew Waxman,
More on NYPD and Local Counterterrorism Intelligence, LAWFARE (May 25, 2012,
10:22 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/more-nypd-and-local-counterterrorism-intel-
ligence.  This remains true even if local police forces receive federal assistance in
resourcing their departments. See, e.g., Jack Gillum & Eileen Sullivan, U.S. Pushing
Local Cops to Stay Mum on Surveillance, YAHOO (June 12, 2014, 4:32 PM), http://
news.yahoo.com/us-pushing-local-cops-stay-174613067.html.
374. See US Intelligence to Keep Tabs on Americans with No Ties to Terror, FOX
NEWS (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/03/22/us-intelligence-to-
keep-tabs-on-americans-with-no-ties-to-terror/; Laura Koran, Threat of Lone Wolf
Attacks Worries Homeland Security Chief, CNN (Nov. 16, 2014, 10:19 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2014/11/16/politics/homeland-security-lone-wolf/index.html?hptHP_t2
(quoting Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson discussing social media activity as
an inspiration for people with no other connections to terrorist organizations, “The
new phenomenon that I see that I’m very concerned about . . . is somebody who has
never met another member of that terrorist organization, never trained at one of the
camps, who is simply inspired by the social media—the literature, the propaganda, the
message—to commit an act of violence in this country.”  The article continues, “John-
son added that, while the U.S. government has largely been successful in disrupting
plots hatched by terrorist cells abroad, catching individuals who are not formally con-
nected requires them to take a different tactic—relying heavily on state and local law
enforcement.”)  A recent Heritage Foundation report found that, of the sixty-four
terrorist plots against the U.S. homeland that it counted between September 11, 2001,
and March 2015, fifty-three of them “were plotted or perpetrated by homegrown ex-
tremists. See Zimmerman, supra note 370.
375. Richard Feloni, Google is Testing a Program that Tracks You Everywhere You
Go, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 7, 2013, 3:29 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com.au/google-
testing-retail-tracking-program-2013-11; Liam Spradlin, Exclusive:  Google Will Soon
Introduce ‘Nearby’ to Let Other ‘People, Places, and Things’ Know When You’re
Around, ANDROID POLICE (June 6, 2014), http://www.androidpolice.com/2014/06/06/
exclusive-google-will-soon-introduce-nearby-to-let-other-people-places-and-things-
know-when-youre-around/.
376. Julian Hattem, Facebook Claims ‘a Bug’ Made It Track Nonusers, THE HILL
(Apr. 9, 2015, 6:18 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/238399-facebook-claims-
a-bug-made-it-track-people-not-on-facebook.
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facturers377 monitoring consumers, to employers monitoring employ-
ees,378 remote electronic tracking has become a fact of modern
American life.  In addition to consumers’ tacit consent to such track-
ing by continuing to use the goods and services that track them, indi-
viduals also increasingly sacrifice not just their own privacy, but that
of others (including their children) with countless posts of pictures
and videos that have created a narcissistic culture of exploitation for
entertainment purposes, exposing them and their antics to voyeuristic
strangers constantly and desensitizing themselves and others (espe-
cially in younger generations) to the importance of keeping certain
things private.  Although, as the Bill of Rights recognizes, unwar-
ranted government intrusions can be threats in and of themselves, the
U.S. government is not a unique operator in the realm of surveillance
and data collection; it does, however, have a unique purpose, which is
to protect the American public.379
Such a bold statement means nothing, however, if there is no credi-
bility in the system—including both the architecture and the people
operating it.  In the American constitutional system of limited govern-
ment, the burden of building and maintaining that credibility is indeed
with the government.  Although two presidents of different parties,
multiple congresses of different compositions, and many federal
judges have all given constitutional blessing to these programs that
have caused such controversy, perceived missteps, like Director of Na-
tional Intelligence James Clapper’s open Senate testimony about NSA
collection on Americans, have led many to be skeptical about the na-
377. Joan Lowy, Carmakers Unite Around Privacy Protections, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Nov. 13, 2014, 12:31 AM), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2014/Carmakers-sign-on-
to-principles-to-protect-motorists’-privacy-in-an-era-of-computerized-cars/id-
8b512b438b3b41be98bf5d9bfecfc249 (“[C]omputerized cars pass along more informa-
tion about their drivers than many motorists realize.”).
378. See, e.g., Adam Jones, The Spies in the Cellar Are Now Sidling Up to Your
Desk, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 28, 2014, 1:33 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
9412d776-89b4-11e4-8daa-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3NGBqipIS (describing workplace
monitoring tools, including sensors in name tags, and desk occupancy sensors).  Some
employers even have tried demanding employees provide to their (i.e., the employ-
ees’) passwords for their social media accounts.  Rob Manker, Facebook Joins Fight to
Ban Employers from Requiring Workers’ Passwords, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 23, 2012), http:/
/www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ct-talk-facebook-passwords-folo-0324-20120324
,0,4697740.story; Senators Call for Federal Probe Over Employers Asking for
Facebook Passwords, FOX NEWS (Mar. 25, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/
2012/03/25/senators-call-for-federal-probe-over-employers-asking-for-facebook-pass-
words/; David L. Hudson, Jr., Site Unseen:  Schools, Bosses Barred from Eyeing Stu-
dents’, Workers’ Social Media, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2012 8:10 AM), http://www
.abajournal.com/magazine/article/site_unseen_schools_bosses_barred_from_eyeing_
students_workers_social_media/.
379. See, e.g., George W. Bush, President Discusses Creation of Military Commis-
sions to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006) (noting the President’s job is to “pro-
tect the American people”) (transcript available at http://georgewbush-white
house.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html).
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ture and value of reported government surveillance programs.380
Lawfare contributor Jane Chong explains, “To gain the trust of the
American people, the intelligence community must be understood as
being governed by hard, intelligible jurisdictional constraints.  And in
the post-9/11, post-Wikileaks and post-Snowden era, it will be harder
than ever to persuade Americans that such hard constraints exist.”381
Nevertheless, as seen after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Ameri-
cans also demand the intelligence community to be effective, and they
hold it accountable when tragedy strikes.  That in mind, being honest
and level-headed about how Americans treat privacy in all aspects of
their lives, and how everyday behavior and desire for convenience
might enable devastating attacks,382 is critical to resolving a national
security policy dispute for which existing Fourth Amendment prece-
dent has limited applicability.383
380. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, James Clapper’s ‘Least Untruthful’ Statement to the
Senate, WASH. POST (Jun. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-
checker/post/james-clappers-least-untruthful-statement-to-the-senate/2013/06/11/
e50677a8-d2d8-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_blog.html.  Notwithstanding arguments that
Director Clapper never should have been made to answer certain questions about
classified programs during an unclassified hearing, the potential harm from such state-
ments is not merely moral but also economic. See also Joseph Menn, Russian Re-
searchers Expose Breakthrough U.S. Spying Program, YAHOO NEWS (Feb. 16, 2015,
5:10 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/russian-researchers-expose-breakthrough-u-spying-
program-194217480—sector.html (noting potential economic consequences if con-
sumers and trade partners question the integrity of the supply chain of technological
products that could have built-in vulnerabilities).  In theory, manufacturers of physi-
cal technology-sector goods might be subject to the same standards as technology
service providers.  Note, however, that a complete assessment of the potential eco-
nomic cost requires weighing the potential economic losses from concerns about sup-
ply chain integrity against the costs of unattributable cyberattacks that might be more
likely to occur without such tools. Cf. Barry Ritholtz, Cybercrime Is Your Worry,
Too, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2015, at F1 (noting that cybercrime costs the United States
$100 billion annually, out of a total estimated $575 billion cost to the global
economy).
381. Jane Chong, Why Americans Don’t Trust the Intelligence Community,
LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/03/on-why-
americans-dont-trust-the-intelligence-community/.
382. See Malia Zimmerman, Security Expert Pulled Off Flight by FBI After Expos-
ing Airline Tech Vulnerabilities, FOX NEWS (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.foxnews.
com/us/2015/04/16/security-expert-pulled-off-flight-by-fbi-after-exposing-airline-tech/
(describing a report by the Government Accountability Office discussing the possibil-
ity that a commercial airliner’s in-flight entertainment system may be vulnerable to a
hack that could shut off the engines of the plane).
383. Cf. In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (“[W]e hold
that a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
exists when surveillance is conducted to obtain foreign intelligence for national secur-
ity purposes and is directed against foreign powers or agents of foreign powers rea-
sonably believed to be located outside the United States.”).
